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ABSTRACT
This Article explores how Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) emerged both from thwarted efforts at immigration reform and the
Supreme Court's highly anticipated decision in Arizona v. United States.' I argue that DACA not only was adopted in response to repeated failed efforts to
pass the DREAM Act; it was also promulgated in anticipation of a possible favorable ruling by the Court on S.B. 1070. In Part I, I examine the current separation of powers crisis in immigration policy. I look at both the context in
which DACA was adopted and at challenges to DACA in Court and in Congress. I classify the constitutional arguments against DACA into four different
categories: 1) The Youngstown/Curtiss- Wright Dichotomy; 2) The NonDelegation Doctrine Resurrection; 3) The "Take Care" Clause Crisis; and 4)
The Notice and Comment Myth. In Part II, I address the federalism crisis. I argue that DACA was aimed at least in part at weakening the potential impact of
S.B. 1070 by carving out a class of individuals who the states could not target
and placing them in a quasi-legal status that hopefully would immunize them
from state enforcement of the immigration laws. I examine deferred action as
one of many twilight statuses where beneficiaries enjoy temporary relief from
removal, (often) eligibility for work authorization, and (sometimes) the prospect of lawful residency. I look briefly at subfederal responses to DACA, including several states' denial of driver's licenses to DACA recipients. I ultimately conclude that DACA was a justifiable assertion of Executive authority
in the face of gridlock in Congress and restrictionism in many states. DACA
fell squarely within Executive enforcement powers under an expansive interpretation of congressional and Executive authority that has deep roots in the
plenary power doctrine, case law going back over a century, the wellestablished use of deferred action and similar forms of prosecutorial discretion,
and the broad delegation of powers by Congress to the Executive under the
Immigration & Nationality Act. In short, like Dorothy's ruby slippers, the Administration's power was there all along. In announcing DACA on the eves of
the Court's decision in Arizona v. United States and the 2012 elections, the
Obama Administration took a bold political move that not only may have won
him the election but may have reenergized his Administration, restored balance
in the government, and laid the foundation for comprehensive immigration reform. At the same time the Administration in its final term needs to work within the constraints of the Constitution, focus on reform in Congress, and not establish a precedent for unilateralism that will be subject to abuse in future
administrations.

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces
immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger
than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.
The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors,
including whether the alien has children born in the United
States, long ties to the community, or a recordof distinguished
military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy
choices that bear on this Nation's internationalrelations.Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or
fails to meet the criteriafor admission. The foreign state may
be mired in civil war, complicit in politicalpersecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his
family will be harmed upon return.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current crisis in American politics and the American legal system
is as much a crisis of federalism as it is of separation of powers. Nowhere has
this been more evident than in the area of immigration policy. Over the last
decade, repeated attempts in Congress at both comprehensive immigration reform ("CIR") and more targeted proposals, including the DREAM Act and
AgJobs, met with defeat in Congress despite bipartisan support.3 Antiimmigrant forces in and out of Congress used a range of tactics to defeat reform, from the Senate filibuster, to use of the broadcast media, to mobilization
of supporters to shut down Congressional phone lines.4
Meanwhile, state and local governments took the regulation of immigrants into their own hands based on a range of theories reducible to the basic
argument that the federal government was not adequately enforcing the immigration laws, either because of a lack of resources or a lack of will.s At times,
2

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.

3
See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudentialand Historic
Perspectives on the Agiobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 417, 469-71 (2005) [hereinafter
Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair] (discussing institutionalist theories for why the
AgJobs Bill of 2003 failed).
4
See N.C. Aizenman, Small-Town America Resists Latino Newcomers, WASH. PosT, June
29, 2007, at Al; Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Bill Dies in Senate: Bipartisan Compromise
Fails to Satisfy the Right or the Left, WASH. PosT, June 29, 2007, at Al; see also Lauren Gilbert,
National Identity and Immigration Policy in the US and the European Union, 14 COLUM. J.EUR.
L. 99, 113-14 (2008).
s
See, e.g., Carissa Hessick, Mirror Image Theory in State Immigration Regulation,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 13, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/mirror-image-theory-instate-immigration-regulation/;Marc Lacey & Salvador Rodriguez, Arizona Sues Federal Gov-
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states claimed that they were "cooperating" with the federal government in enforcing the immigration laws. In the same breath, state officials argued that
they were filling the vacuum left by the federal government's failure to enforce
the law.6
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Executive Branch responded to
these developments in 2012 by reaffirming the central role of the Federal Executive with regard to immigration enforcement. On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,7 struck down three of the four challenged provisions of Arizona's S.B. 1070, the anti-immigrant legislation that sparked a
wave of copycat legislation around the country.8 President Barack Obama, in a
Statement released that same day, indicated that, while pleased the Court had
struck down §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070, he was troubled by the decision to
dismiss the facial challenge to § 2(B), the "show me your papers" provision.
I remain concerned about the practical impact of the remaining
provision of the Arizona law that requires local law enforcement officials to check the immigration status of anyone they
even suspect to be here illegally. I agree with the Court that individuals cannot be detained solely to verify their immigration
status. No American should ever live under a cloud of suspicion just because of what they look like. 9

ernment for Failure to Enforce Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (blog) (Feb. 10, 2011, 5:29 PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/arizona-plans-to-sue-federal-government/?_r-0.
6
Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch,
33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 187-89 (2012) (discussing lower court decisions finding that

states had authority to cooperate in immigration law enforcement); see also S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Politicalin ImmigrationFederalism,
44 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1431, 1435 (2013) (arguing that the gridlock in Congress and subfederal enforcement of the immigration laws are "linked and interdependent" and that anti-immigration
forces have worked at various government levels, stalemating Congressional action at the federal
level to justify state and local enforcement efforts).
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
Among the challenged provisions, § 2(B) requires law enforcement officers to attempt to
verify a person's immigration status if reasonable suspicion exists to believe the person is not
lawfully in the United States, and, if the person is arrested, to verify the person's immigration
status before the person is released; § 3 made it a state misdemeanor for a noncitizen to fail to
register or carry proof of immigration status in violation of federal law; § 5(C) made it a misdemeanor for an "unauthorized alien" to seek or engage in work; and § 6 authorized the warrantless
arrest of any person if there were probable cause to believe the person had committed a deportable offense. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-1051; 13-1509; 13-2928; 13-3883 (2010).
9
See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Supreme
Court's Ruling on Arizona v. United States (June 25, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-sruling-arizona-v-united-states.
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The Court interpreted this provision to only apply where state authorities detain an individual pursuant to an otherwise legitimate stop or arrest.10
Although it found that § 2(B) was not unconstitutional on its face, it indicated
that it could be unconstitutional as applied if detention were prolonged beyond
the time required to conduct a lawful stop." Nonetheless, by striking down §§
3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070, the Court took the teeth out of § 2(B), invoking
traditional preemption principles to do so. 12 What struck many as significant
was that the five-person majority included Chief Justice John Roberts, who,
along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor (Justice Elena Kagan recused herself), joined Justice Anthony Kennedy in reaffirming the primacy of the federal government with regard to immigration enforcement.13
Perhaps not coincidentally, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona
came on the heels of a new directive announced by the Obama Administration
only ten days earlier, to grant immigration relief in the form of deferred action
to certain young people who had come to the United States as children. 14 After
over ten years of fruitless efforts in Congress to pass the DREAM Act into
law, 15 the so-called DREAMers decided that it was time to emerge from the
shadows and mobilize publicly for some form of immigration relief.16 With the
2012 elections looming and the stars aligned, the Obama Administration an-

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. at 2509-10.
12
Reaffirming Hines v. Davidowitz, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941), the Court found that the federal
government still occupied the field of alien registration in striking down § 3. Arizona, 132 S. Ct.
at 2501. It found that § 5(C), making it a state misdemeanor to seek or engage in unauthorized
employment, and § 6, permitting warrantless arrests on probable cause that a noncitizen had
committed a removable offense, stood as obstacles to federal immigration enforcement. Id. at
2503, 2507. Cf Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REv. 601, 626-34 (2013)
(majority nominally applied traditional preemption principles but in fact was applying what she
labels "plenary power preemption").
13
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.
14
See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children
(June
15,
2012)
[hereinafter
Napolitano
Memo],
available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf.
15
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010); S.
729, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 774, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1545,
108th Cong. (2003); S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001).
16
Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-ActionDream, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2012, at A2.
10

1
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nounced that it would defer many DREAMers' deportation and grant them
work authorization.17
The Administration's announcement of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals ("DACA") was met with a backlash in the conservative media and
from Republicans in Congress.' 8 Even Justice Antonin Scalia criticized it in his
dissent in Arizona, saying that it would assure immunity from enforcement for
thousands of Arizona's 400,000 illegal immigrants.19 Two months later, Kris
Kobach, Kansas' Secretary of State and the mastermind behind the Arizona
statute and much of the copycat legislation sweeping the country, filed a complaint against Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and John
Morton, the director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), on behalf of several ICE officers claiming that DACA was unconstitutional because
it usurped legislative authority and violated the Executive's duty to see that the
laws were faithfully executed, and that it violated administrative law. 2 0 The
State of Mississippi joined the complaint two months later.21 In April 2013, the
district court was inclined to grant a preliminary injunction after finding that
the ICE plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, but it requested additional briefing on whether it had jurisdiction in light of the Civil
Service Reform Act ("the CSRA"). 22 On July 31, 2013, it reluctantly dismissed

17
The new directive applies to a noncitizen who came to the United States while under the
age of 16, who continuously resided in the United States for five years prior to announcement of
the directive, who is in or has graduated from high school or a GED program or was honorably
discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces; who has not been convicted of a felony or significant
misdemeanors, or multiple misdemeanors, or is otherwise a threat to national security or the public safety; and who is not above the age of 30. Napolitano Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
18
See, e.g., O'Reilly Factor: Personal Story (FOX News television broadcast Aug. 25,
2012), available at 2012 WLNR 18123422 (FOX News anchor Monica Crowley accused President Obama of violating duties as chief law enforcement officer and usurping legislative authority); Letter from Lamar Smith, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to John Morton, Director, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter
Letter
from
Lamar
Smith],
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/DreamActLetterICE.pdf (describing new policy as an amnesty, an overreach of Executive authority, and a magnet for fraud).
19
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20
Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter ICE Complaint].
21
Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2012 WL 5199509
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Amended ICE Complaint].
22
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL
1744422 (N.D. Tex. April 23, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion and Order, Crane v. Napolitano].
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the suit, finding that the CSRA provided the exclusive means for resolution of
what amounted to a labor dispute.23
This Article explores the symbiotic relationship between thwarted efforts at immigration reform, the decision in Arizona, and the promulgation of
and responses to DACA. I argue that DACA not only was adopted in response
to repeated failed efforts to pass the DREAM Act, but was also promulgated in
anticipation of a favorable ruling by the Court on S.B. 1070 and designed to
ameliorate the potentially harsh effects of that law and similar copycat laws by
immunizing a class of individuals, the DREAMers, who the states could not
target. I address various constitutional arguments being made regarding DACA.
I ultimately conclude that DACA was a justifiable assertion of Executive authority in the face of a constitutional crisis marked by gridlock in Congress and
restrictionism in many states. To announce DACA on the eves of the Court's
decision in Arizona v. United States and the 2012 elections might be seen as
what Professor Louis Michael Seidman would call an "act of constitutional disobedience."2 4 Nonetheless, in embracing the DREAMers and granting them deferred action, the Obama election may have reenergized his Administration, restored balance in the government, and laid the foundation for comprehensive
immigration reform.25
There is a small but growing body of work on prosecutorial discretion
in the immigration context 26 and a substantial body of work on immigration
federalism, 27 but there is little work that ties the two ideas together. Much of

Order, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 6 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013) (dismissing suit for lack of jurisdiction), available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/27924754/
Crane75%207-31-13.pdf.
24
Louis Michael Seidman, Op-Ed., Let's Give Up on the Constitution,N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31,
2012, at A19.
25
At the time of this writing, the U.S. Senate had just passed a comprehensive immigration
bill which included a 13-year path to citizenship for many of the 11 million unauthorized immigrants currently living in the United States. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2102 (2013) (as passed by Senate, June
27, 2013).
26
See, e.g., KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42924,
23

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES (Jan. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42924.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report]; Michael A.
Olivas, Dreams Deferred: DeferredAction, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Vexing Case(s) of
DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 463, 472-73 (2012); Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243
(2010).
27 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L J. 1256 (2009); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567 (2008); Peter Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57; Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
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the scholarship that does focus on this connection looks at state and local criminal laws that mimic or mirror federal immigration laws 2 8 or examines the federalism and individual rights dimension, focusing, for example, on preemption
as a surrogate for equal protection 29 or on how preemption analysis obscures
the civil rights dimensions of the problem. 3 0 This Article offers a different perspective, operating in the realm of administrative law and separation of powers
within the federal government and looking at the respective roles of Congress
and the Executive in responding to subfederal immigration restrictionism.3 1 It
recognizes the important role political dynamics play in shaping the terms of
legal and legislative strategies and the role of rhetoric and heuristics in shaping
popular opinion and public acceptance of litigation and legislative outcomes.

Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of
Bigotry? Devolution of the ImmigrationPower, Equal Protection,and Federalism,76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493 (2001).
28
See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Over-CriminalizingImmigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
613 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionalityof State Regulation oflmmigration CriminalLaw, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011).
29
See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 125 (forthcoming 2014) (draft
on file with author) [hereinafter MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW]; Lucas Guttentag,

Discrimination,Preemption andArizona's Immigration Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/discriminationpreemption; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: FederalImmigrationEnforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-CriminalLine, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1825-26 (2011)
[hereinafter Motomura, The Discretion That Matters].
30
See Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially DisparateImpacts
ofArizona's S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 313 (2012), availableat http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol2/nol/johnson.pdf.
31
See also Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President andImmigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (examining how the immigration power is allocated between Congress and
the Executive, and exploring the asymmetries in immigrant admissions and immigration enforcement, recommending greater formal delegation of ex ante screening authority to the President).
32
For an empirical piece recognizing the political dynamics of immigration law and how politics fundamentally alters judicial, scholarly, and public evaluations of immigration federalism,
see Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 6. I thank my colleague, Patricia Hatamyar
Moore, who has examined the use of heuristics to perpetuate the myth of state court class action
abuses. Heuristics is the phenomenon by which "the mind automatically attempts to create a coherent story out of the information it has, even if that information is incomplete or invalid." See
Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of State Court ClassAction Abuses Through an
Understandingof Heuristics and a Pleafor More Statistics, 82 UMKC L. REv. 1 (forthcoming
2014). In reading her paper, I was struck by how Kris Kobach, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer,
anti-immigrant groups, the conservative media, and even Justice Scalia have effectively made use
of the same phenomenon to generate anti-immigrant sentiment in the public at large. See Arizona
v. United States, 132. S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("States have the right to
protect their borders against foreign nationals, just as they have the right to execute foreign nationals for murder."); Jeremy Duda, Goddard,Brewer Debate Jobs, Budget, 'HeadlessBodies,'
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While I agree with recent scholarship identifying the feedback loop connecting
statutory schemes, their implementation, and public reactions, I believe that
this literature undervalues the central role of the Executive in setting and implementing immigration policy.34 I conclude that, despite a cleverly-designed
litigation and media campaign to prove the contrary, DACA was a bold political move that fell squarely within traditional Executive enforcement powers
under an interpretation of Congressional and Executive authority over immigration that has deep roots in the plenary power doctrine, case law going back over
a century, the established use of deferred action and similar forms of prosecutorial discretion for both individual and group-based relief, and the broad delegation of powers by Congress to the Executive under the Immigration & Nationality Act ("INA").
Intriguingly, in crafting and justifying DACA, government insiders and
outsiders would be faced with having to rely on many of the same legal arguments that the scholarly community (some of whom were now insiders and
others of whom were advocates) had critiqued in other contexts. This piece
addresses the argument that the Executive had inherent power to adopt DACA,
independent of power delegated by Congress, given the oft-stated connection

ARiz.
CAPITOL
TIMEs,
Sept.
1,
2010,
available
at
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2010/09/01/goddard-brewer-debate-hinges-on-jobs-budget-andheadless-bodies/; FOX News: O'Reilly Factor,supra note 18; see also Daniel I. Morales, ImmigrationReform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 49, 60 (2013) (arguing
that "[tireating nativism as fixed and the democratic will as something that needs to be stifled is
the wrong way to change the trajectory of [immigration [law]" and that these values have become
"so entrenched in our legal culture" that they "must be worked around, not against").
3
See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cu6llar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2
U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 1, 29-30 (2012), available at http://www.law.uci.edullawreview/
vol2/nol/cuellar.pdf.
3
Id. at 6 (describing the presidency as having "surprisingly limited capacity to drastically
change the immigration status quo through executive action").
35
Cf David Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism:A Return to Form, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PuB. POL'Y 101, 106 (2013) (arguing that nonbinding Executive enforcement policies do not
qualify as "laws" and are not made "in pursuance of' the Constitution and thus have neither the
force of law nor preemptive effect); Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration: Presidential
Stewardship, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Separation of Powers, Roger Williams Legal
Studies Paper No. 133 (Feb. 11, 2013) (working paper on file with the West Virginia Law Review) (rejecting prosecutorial discretion as a basis for DACA but finding that the use of Executive power was justified under a stewardship model of Executive authority).
36
See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (2000) (currently Chief Counsel of USCIS);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century ofPlenaryPower: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (principal author of Law Professors' Letter, infra note 45, justifying the use of Executive authority to grant relief from removal
to the DREAMers).
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between the regulation of immigration and foreign affairs.3 7 The Supreme
Court identified this source of power in many of its early decisions.38 It also arguably is consistent with the Supreme Court's language in Arizona emphasizing the importance of broader foreign policy considerations in analyzing immigration preemption. 3 9 At the same time, an inherent powers argument is not
only of questionable historical accuracy,4 0 but it has allowed the Court in the
past to uphold immigration policies treading on the civil rights of noncitizens
that would be unconstitutional in any other context.4 1 It appears that both
DACA's supporters and the Department of Homeland Security have been reluctant to embrace an inherent powers rationale, focusing instead on Congress'
broad delegation of power to the Executive, on historic practice, and on DACA
as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion consistent with the existing framework announced a year earlier by ICE Director John Morton in what became
known as the "Morton Memo.'A2
During the 2008 presidential primaries, when Barack Obama was being
favorably compared to Martin Luther King, Jr., Hillary Clinton drew political
fire when she claimed that without President Lyndon B. Johnson, none of the
civil rights reforms would have been possible: "Dr. King's dream began to be
realized when President Johnson passed the Civil Rights Act. . . . It took a

president to get it done."4 3 Although intended at the time as a criticism of thencandidate Obama, her words, ironically, have proven prophetic. Without

3
See, e.g., Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 31, at 475-76 (indicating that by mid-20t century,
the Court thought that the President possessed at least some power to regulate immigration without Congressional authorization, and even despite Congressional action).
38
See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 705-07 (1893); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604-06 (1889).
3
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
40
Raoul Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly ofForeignRelations, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1,26-33
(1972).
41
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.").
42
Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent With the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011)
[hereinafter
Morton
Memo],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf, Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief at 12, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-3247-O,
2012 WL 6633751 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Defendant's Opposition, Crane v. Napolitano].
43
Sarah Wheaton, Clinton's Civil Rights Lesson, N.Y. TIMEs (blog) (Jan. 7, 2008),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/civilrights/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
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DREAMers' courage in coming out of the shadows and risking deportation, the
Administration would not have considered such a bold move. Indeed, in the
years leading up to DACA, Obama officials repeatedly told advocates that,
while they supported the DREAM Act, it was up to Congress to pass it into
law.44 Although the 2012 elections increased pressure on the Administration to
respond favorably, without legal cover, it also is unlikely that the Administration would have acted. The law professors' letter, drafted by Professor Hiroshi
Motomura of UCLA and signed by 96 law professors, which laid out a legal
argument for why Executive action was within the scope of Executive power,
provided that cover.45 Like Dorothy's ruby slippers, the Administration's power
was there all along.
Part I focuses on separation of powers. I address several of the constitutional arguments being made against DACA, particularly in light of severe
criticisms from both the right and the left of President Obama's bold assertion
of Executive powers in other contexts.4 6 I recount the story of DACA,47 then
examine the litigation brought by Kris Kobach on behalf of several ICE officers
challenging DACA. I also examine the context in which DACA was adopted,
focusing in particular on the impasse in Congress for over a decade on immigration reform. I address four different arguments being made against DACA,
which I categorize as 1) The Youngstown/Curtiss-Wright Dichotomy; 2) The
Non-Delegation Doctrine Resurrection; 3) The "Take Care" Crisis; and 4) The
Notice and Comment Myth. I also look briefly at a recent effort in the U.S.

4
Julia Preston, Young Immigrants Say It's Obama's Time to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012,
at Al; see also Olivas, supra note 26, at 472-73 (describing how in 2011, when a group of U.S.
Senators sent a letter to President Obama urging that he not target DREAM Act-eligible students,
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano responded that, as sympathetic as they were, no category of
Prosecutorial Discretion would be employed for groups of individuals).
45
See Letter from Immigration Law Professors to President Obama, Executive Authority to
Grant Administrative Relief to Dream Act Beneficiaries (May 28, 2012) [hereinafter Law Professors' Letter], available at http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityFor
DREAMRelief28May2O12withSignatures.pdf.
46
At the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools ("AALS") in January
2013 in New Orleans, Professors Michael McConnell and Richard Pildes discussed President
Obama's expansive use of Executive powers during the Constitutional Law section breakfast. See
Ass'N. AM. L. SCH., PresidentialPower under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations,2013 Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2013), http://aals.org/am20l3/FinalProgram2013.pdf.
47
Although I was one of the 96 signatories to the Law Professors' Letter, and was in email
correspondence with Professor Motomura at the time, I rely largely on several of the better news
accounts in telling the story of how DACA was adopted. Professor Motomura has corroborated
my retelling of the story, while providing background information to fill in some of the details
regarding his role in brainstorming with the DREAMers and drafting the Law Professors' Letter.
E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA (March 8, 2013, 1:07 PM) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter First E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura].

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

266

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

House of Representatives to defund both DACA and administration of the Morton Memo.
Part II focuses on the federalism crisis. It looks at the relationship between the Court's impending decision in Arizona v. United States and the Administration's announcement of DACA. It explores how DACA was adopted
largely in anticipation of a possible favorable ruling by the Court on S.B. 1070,
and was aimed at weakening the impact of S.B. 1070 and other copycat laws by
carving out a class of individuals eligible for relief from deportation who the
states could not touch. I demonstrate why the use of deferred action to provide
temporary relief from removal to the DREAMers was consistent with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion over the last 40 years. I examine deferred action
as just one of many twilight statuses utilized by the immigration authorities
where beneficiaries enjoy temporary relief from removal, (often) eligibility for
work authorization, and (sometimes) the prospect of lawful residency. I briefly
look at subfederal responses to DACA, including several states' reluctance to
issue driver's licenses to persons granted deferred action under DACA, and the
legal arguments being made to challenge such practices.
The Crane v. Napolitano4 9 lawsuit, the refusal to issue driver's licenses
to DACA recipients, and efforts in the Republican-dominated House of Representatives to defund DACA can all be seen as part of a broader strategy by immigration restrictionists to undermine the Administration's use of prosecutorial
discretion as an enforcement tool. I conclude that while DACA was within the
scope of Executive authority and justified in light of these dual crises in separation of powers and federalism, the Administration's actions fell just within the
outer perimeters of Executive Power. In its final term, the Administration must
strive to work within the constraints of the Constitution, to focus on reform in
Congress, and to not establish a precedent for unilateralism that will be subject
to abuse in future administrations.

See 159 CONG. REC. H3208-3212, 3222, 3225 (2013) (amendment, debate, and vote to defund DACA and administration of the Morton Memo).
49
Order, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, at 6 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013) (disavailable
at
lack
of
jurisdiction),
missing
suit
for
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/27924754/Crane75%207-31-13.pdf.
48
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II. DACA, COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND OUR SEPARATION
OF POWERS CRISIS

A.

DACA and the DREAMers: A BriefBackground

For many years, they lived in the shadows, depending on immigrant
advocates to lobby for the DREAM Act in Congress.so They had come to this
country as children, brought here in most cases by their parents. Many had
grown up in this country, learning English, going to school, and thinking of
themselves as Americans, many even believing that they were. Then, when it
came time for higher education, many learned that they were not eligible for
financial aid or in-state tuition, because they were not here legally. 5 Most
lacked the means to become lawful immigrants, since they had not been inspected and admitted, and thus were inadmissible and ineligible to adjust status
in the United States. 52 Many who had turned 18 had begun to accrue unlawful
presence, and thus would be subject to the 3-year and 10-year unlawful presence bars if they attempted to leave and reenter on a visa.
In mid-2001, the Bush Administration indicated that it supported comprehensive reform, including the possible legalization of millions of undocumented persons. 54 Senators Orrin Hatch and Dick Durbin are credited with introducing the first DREAM Act that same year. 5 That first DREAM Act, as

See, e.g., William E. Gibson, Senator is Giving Controversial New Immigrant Bill a
Chance, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 16, 2012, at Al ("'These kids have been in legal limbo for far
too long, and their lives have been on hold for far too long,' said Cheryl Little, executive director
of Americans for Immigrant Justice, based in Miami, which represents 'dreamers' and other immigrants. We need to extend a lifeline to them now. Even if it's temporary relief at this
point.
); David Goldstein, Missouri Student Faces Deportation-Again,KAN. CITY STAR,
May 25, 2006, at A4 ("'There is an immigration war going on in Congress,' said Josh Bernstein
of the National Immigration Law Center. 'In a war, you take the children off the battlefield. You
don't care which side they are on. They should be out of harm's way."'); Jordan, supra note 16,
at A2 ("Previously, undocumented immigrants largely stayed out of the spotlight, leaving others
to speak on their behalf so as not to risk exposing their illegal status. 'We wanted the freedom to
be everyday Americans,' says Ms. Pacheco, 27 years old, a leader of the ... Dreamer[s].").
*
See Jordan,supra note 16, at A2; Julia Preston, Students Pressfor Action on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A14. There is a large body of literature on the DREAMers, both in
the media and more scholarly literature. Much of this literature is discussed in Olivas, supra note
26, at 519-22.
52
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012).
50

INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)-(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)-(iii)(I) (2012).
David Sanger, Mexico's PresidentRewrites the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at Al.
5s
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001);
see also Press Release, Durbin Statement on DREAM Act and Administrative Action to Help
Young Immigrants (June 15, 2012), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ pressreleases?ID=070dl061-66c4-45ef-bb34-41da7ele7d40.
5
54

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

268

[Vol. 116

introduced in the Senate, was fairly limited in scope. It would have allowed
certain young people who had not yet attained the age of 21, who had been
physically present in the United States for at least five years, who were attending institutions of higher education, and who were persons of good moral character to adjust status to lawful permanent residency and eventually apply for
citizenship.16 Other immigration reforms were being considered as well, including AgJobs legislation for agricultural workers. September 11, 2001, brought
all efforts at immigration reform to an immediate halt, but even after that, many
advocates believed that reform was possible.
The potential beneficiaries of the DREAM Act 59 were the very individuals that the Court had embraced in Plyer v. Doe,60 overturning a Texas law
denying public school education to the children of the undocumented. The
Court expressed concern about the creation of a "shadow population,61 a
"permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that
our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents."6 2 It was particularly troubled about denying educational benefits to the children of such individuals, who could not be held accountable for their parents' misconduct. It
found it "difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these
children for their presence within the United States."63 Furthermore, it recog-

56

S. 1291

§ 3.

Gilbert, Fields ofHope, Fields ofDespair,supra note 3, at 440-41.
58

Christine Stapleton, Bush Bypassed Bill by Growers, Farmworkers,
PALM BEACH POST,

Jan. 13, 2004, at lA.
59
Over time, the requirements for relief under the DREAM Act have remained relatively
constant, while reflecting the fact that many of the potential beneficiaries of the Act in 2001,
when the law was first introduced, are now adults, many in their thirties. The current version of
the DREAM Act, as passed in the U.S. Senate, for example, would allow for the adjustment of
status to lawful permanent residency of certain persons who 1) first entered the United States
while under the age of sixteen; 2) have acquired a high school degree or its equivalency; 3) have
received a degree in higher education, completed at least two years towards a bachelor's degree,
or served at least four years in the armed services; 4) have been in "registered provisional immigrant" status for at least five years; and 5) have successfully complete a national security and
criminal background check. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2103 (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
This version would allow for streamlined procedures for persons granted relief under DACA. Id.
§ 2103(b). Some versions would have required that the applicant be under a certain age to qualify, with that age advancing with the passage of time. See, e.g., DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952,
112th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(F) (requiring that applicant be under the age of 35 on the date of Act's enactment).
60
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
61
Id at 218.
62
Id. at 218-19.
63
Id. at 220.
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nized that, "[i]n light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported. . . ."6 Applying what appeared to be intermediate scrutiny in striking down the law, 5 the Court concluded that it was
"difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting
the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries,
surely adding to the problems and costs of employment, welfare, and crime."6 6
While Plyer v. Doe eloquently set forth why this discrete group of children should not be denied a K- 12 public education, it could not solve the problem of what happened when they reached adulthood.67 This was a matter for
Congress and the Executive. Many of these children went on to graduate at the
top of their class but found themselves ineligible for financial aid or in-state
tuition. 68 They became the very shadow-population the Court in Plyer had
warned against. A discrete and insular minority, they could not vote, faced possible deportation if they advocated publicly, and had to rely on others to represent them before Congress. For several years, however, despite various setbacks, it looked hopeful that the DREAM Act would be passed, either on its
own or as part of a comprehensive bill.
The turning point probably came in 2007, where, despite broad bipartisan efforts to pass the Secure Borders Act, including backing from the Bush
Administration, the legislation failed because, notwithstanding majority support
in both houses, the legislation was unable to survive a cloture vote in the Senate. 70 Despite polls indicating that most Americans supported the DREAM Act
and comprehensive immigration reform,71 anti-immigrant forces, including a

64
Id at 226. For a thoughtful discussion of the complexities of unlawful presence and the
relationship among Plyler v. Doe, birthright citizenship, the DREAM Act, and full-scale legalization, see Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, BirthrightCitizenship, and Broadscale Legalization, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1127 (2012).
65
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the
free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.").
66

1d

67

For a powerful account of the story of Plyer v. Doe and its implications for the DREAM

Act, see MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYER V. DOE AND THE
No
(2012) [hereinafter OLIVAS,
SCHOOLCHILDREN
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND].

68

Jordan, supra note 16, at A2.

69

OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND, supra note 67, at 82.

70

Carl Hulse & Robert Pear, Immigrant Bill, Lacking 15 Votes, Stalls in Senate, N.Y. TIMES,

June 8, 2007, at Al.
71

NAT'L IMMTGR. F., While Debate Rages, the Public Continues to Support Realistic Immi-

gration Solutions, (Dec.
/PollingSummary0407.pdf.

10,

2007),

http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads
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number of talk-show radio hosts, mobilized supporters to flood Congress with
calls, shutting down Senate phone lines during the Senate vote. 72
After that, despite efforts to pass a free-standing DREAM Act, by
2010, political intransigence prevailed in Congress. Thus, while President
Obama announced his support for the DREAM Act in the summer of 2010 just
months before the elections, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made a
lukewarm attempt at seeing it through, their efforts proved unsuccessful largely
because by that time winning the midterm elections became more important for
both parties than immigration reform.74 After the midterm elections, the focus
in Congress shifted to the 2012 elections, with even former Republican supporters of immigration reform, like Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham, opposing the DREAM Act and efforts at comprehensive reform.
The 2010 elections, when Republicans won control of the House while
retaining significant numbers in the Senate, was probably the watershed year
for the DREAMers, who realized that, at least for the present, Congress could
not be counted on to pass legislation.76 The focus needed to shift to the Administration, which had courted the Latino vote but thus far had failed to deliver on
its promises of reform. It also became clear to many individuals who were high
school students when these efforts began but were now in their mid-to-late
twenties that time was running out. Excluded from the political process, relying
on immigration advocates had not proven adequate to achieve their goals.7 The
time had come for the DREAMers to transform into a social movement, to engage in marches, protests, and even acts of civil disobedience, and to tell their
personal stories, even if it meant risking detention and deportation. 78
DREAMers around the country began to organize in their communities,
eventually forming United We Dream, whose leadership consisted of undocumented youth. Rather than remaining in the shadows, many "came out" in public events.79 Despite warnings from supporters of the potential consequences,

Julia Preston, Grass Roots Roaredand Immigration Plan Collapsed,N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2007, at Al.
7
See Editorial, Dream Time, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 2010, at A30 (describing poisoned climate for legislative reform and limited prospects for DREAM Act).
74
Peter Baker, Obama Urges Fix to 'Broken'ImmigrationSystem, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010,
at A12; Julia Preston, Democrats Reach Out to Hispanics on Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2010, at A15.
Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Position on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2012, at Al2.
76
Jordan,supra note 16, at A2.
72

n
78

Id.
Id

7
Frank Sharry, How Did We Build an Immigrant Movement? We Learnedfrom Gay Rights
Advocates, WASH. PosT OUTLOOK, March 24, 2013, at BO1.
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they felt that publicizing their plight, gaining support within immigrant communities, and even shaming the Obama Administration into acting had become
their only viable strategy. Without the Latino vote, Barack Obama could lose
the 2012 elections and, without more than promises from the Administration,
the DREAMers and their supporters could not be counted on to deliver that
vote.8 'As late as mid-April 2012, members of the Administration, including
Valerie Jarrett, the President's Senior Advisor, and Cecilia Mufioz, the President's domestic policy advisor and the former Vice-President for Research,
Advocacy and Legislation at the National Council of La Raza, told the
DREAMers that the President lacked the legal authority to grant relief from deportation, and that this was a matter for Congress. One of the Connecticut
DREAMers, Lorella Praeli, the director of advocacy for United We Dream, replied, "With all due respect, I disagree." 82
Approximately one month later, UCLA law professor Hiroshi Motomura reached out to a number of immigration law professors to ask who might
be willing to sign on to a letter to the Administration explaining why it was
within the Executive's prosecutorial discretion to grant relief from deportation
to the DREAMers. Professor Motomura drafted the letter with the assistance of
Jessica Karp, an attorney at the National Day Labor Organizing Network, after
a meeting with a group of DREAMers in the Los Angeles area. The DREAMers described to him how members of the Administration had told them that the
Administration lacked the authority to provide relief and that this was a matter
for Congress to resolve. The DREAMers had done their research, and already
were familiar with different forms of prosecutorial discretion that might be
available, so Professor Motomura's discussion with them was more in the nature of a brainstorming session where they explored the pros and cons of each
approach. 84 At the end of the discussion, the group asked him if he would be
willing to draft a letter to the Administration laying out this analysis, and forward it on to other immigration law professors for signatures.85 Shortly after
this initial contact, Professor Motomura forwarded a draft letter on to those
who had indicated an interest in signing, asking for feedback. 6 A week later,
on May 29, 2012, a group of DREAMers and their attorneys meeting with
80

Id.

Julia Preston, Immigration Vote Leaves Obama'sPolicy in Disarray,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18,
2010, at A35.
82
Preston, supra note 44, at Al.
83
First E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 47.
84
E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA (June 24, 2013, 1:04 PM) (on
file with author).
85
First E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 47.
86
E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA (May 23, 2012, 2:19 AM) (on
file with author).
81

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

272

[Vol. 116

White House officials hand-delivered a finalized version of the letter, signed by
96 law professors."
The letter laid out why the Administration had legal authority to grant
the DREAMers as a group relief from deportation. It described three possible
forms of relief: deferred action, parole in place, and deferred enforced departure. 88 The letter explained that INA § 103(a) gave the Secretary of Homeland
Security broad authority to administer and enforce the immigration laws. 89 The
letter described how deferred action was a form of prosecutorial discretion that
the Executive Branch had exercised at least since 1971, as federal courts have
acknowledged its existence at least since the mid-1970s. 90
It went on to describe how both parole and deferred enforced departure,
while granted on a case-by-case basis, had been used by the Executive to benefit groups of individuals seeking immigration relief.9 ' Parole had been granted
to large groups of Cubans in 1980 and 1994, and Haitian orphans in 2010.92
Deferred enforced departure had been granted by almost every Administration
since Dwight D. Eisenhower to at least one group of noncitizens.9 3 The letter
described how under each of these forms of relief, recipients were eligible for
work authorization. 94 It emphasized that it was neither addressing the policy
consequences nor recommended a particular form of relief.9 5 Rather, it explained these different options, described their historical and legal bases, and
laid out why it was within the President's Executive powers under the INA and
within Homeland Security's prosecutorial discretion to grant, on a case-by-case
basis, group-based relief.
The Letter gave the White House the legal cover it needed. 9 6 On June
15, 2012, barely two weeks after this meeting and receiving the letter, Janet
Napolitano announced the Administration's new policy of "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as

87
E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA (May 29, 2012, 3:46 AM) (on
file with author); see also Bertrand Gutierrez, Law Professors' Letter May Have Swayed Obama,
WNSTON-SALEM J., June 26, 2012, available at http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/article

f5df40ee-138f-53d3-aefl-a4d0b0923cf5.html.
88
89
90

Law Professors' Letter, supra note 45, at 1-3.
Id. at 2.

91

Id
Idat 3.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 1-3.
Id at 1.
Gutierrez, supra note 87.

9s
96
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Children." 97 Several aspects of the Department of Homeland Security's 98 new
policy are worth noting:
The Napolitano Memo, which is directed to the heads of Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), emphasizes that the directive
granting deferred action involves an exercise of prosecutorial discretion within
the Secretary's powers; 99
It describes why this group of individuals, brought here as children, is
not within DHS's enforcement priorities;o00
It sets forth specific criteria for granting relief, on case-by-case basis,
to qualifying individuals;' 0'
It provides specific instructions for how ICE, CBP and USCIS are to
treat qualifying individuals who are stopped or detained, as well as how it
should handle the cases of individuals already in removal proceedings. 10 2
It instructs USCIS to come up with a process for submitting and processing applications, and orders that USCIS begin implementing this process
within 60 days. 0 3
It instructs that, for persons granted deferred action, USCIS should accept applications for work authorization.
Finally, the memo indicates that the directive "confers no substantive
right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting
through its legislative authority, can confer these rights. It remains for the
executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion
within the framework of existing law. I have done so here."' 05

Napolitano Memo, supra note 14.
The Department of Homeland Security, created in 2002 in response to the World Trade
Center attack, integrates 22 different federal departments and agencies into one unified department, including those functions previously administered by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"), which are now handled by U.S. Citizen & Immigration Services ("USCIS"),
which provides immigration services, Immigration & Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), which enforces the immigration laws internally, and Customs & Border Patrol ("CBP"), which enforces
the laws at the border and ports of entry. See Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last
visited Sept. 11, 2013).
99
Napolitano Memo, supra note 14, at 2.
97

98

101

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 1.

102

Id. at 2.

103

Id. at 2-3.

'"

Id. at 3.

105

Id.

100
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Secretary Napolitano characterized DACA as a general statement of
policy and carefully fit it within the existing framework for exercising prosecutorial discretion announced almost exactly one year earlier by ICE Director
John Morton.10 6 The Morton Memo, also a product of intensive efforts by immigration advocates and scholars,' 07 provided "guidance on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to ensure that the Agency's immigration enforcement
resources were focused on the agency's enforcement priorities" and set out a
non-exhaustive list of 19 factors that ICE officers should consider in determining whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion was warranted, including
but not limited to:
1. The agency's civil immigration enforcement priorities
2. The person's length of presence in the United States
3. The circumstances of the person's arrival and the manner of his or her entry, particularly if he or she came as
a young child
4. The person's pursuit of education in the United States
5. Service in the military
6. The person's criminal history
7. Whether the person poses a threat to national security
or public safety
8. The person's ties and contributions to the community,
including family relations
9. Eligibility for immigration relief
10. Cooperation with law enforcement.'0
While these prosecutorial discretion factors clearly contemplated the
plight of the DREAMers, and would have allowed and even encouraged ICE
field officers to exercise discretion in individual cases, they did not require
them to do so, and thus left open the possibility that many individuals who
were low enforcement priorities still faced the threat of apprehension by ICE or
state and local officers and placement in removal proceedings. By setting out
clear criteria for deferred action for DACA-eligible individuals, DHS cabined
the discretion of ICE and its field agents and placed it within the control of
USCIS, DHS's adjudicatory arm.
Morton Memo, supra note 42.
See Doris Meissner & Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting Course, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., 2009, at 25, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_
Feb09.pdf; Donald Kerwin, Doris Meissner & Margie McHugh, Executive Action on Immigration: Six Ways to Make the System Work Better, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., 14-19 (2011),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/administrativefixes.pdf; Wadhia, supra note 26; see also
Leon Wildes, The DeferredAction Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A PossibleRemedy for Impossible Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 819 (2004).
108
Morton Memo, supra note 42, at 4.
106
107
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Challenges to DACA's Constitutionality

A conservative backlash quickly followed. In his dissent in Arizona,
Justice Antonin Scalia asserted that the new policy would assure immunity
from enforcement for thousands of Arizona's 400,000 illegal immigrants.' 09 A
week later, on July 3, 2012, Lamar Smith, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to John Morton, the director of ICE, labeling the new policy
an "amnesty," "an overreach of executive branch authority," and a "magnet for
fraud."" 0 In August, Kris Kobach filed a complaint against Napolitano and
Morton on behalf of several ICE officers claiming that DACA was unconstitutional because it usurped legislative authority and violated the Executive's duty
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and that it violated administrative law because it had been issued without notice and comment rulemaking in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act."' The ICE plaintiffs, including Chris Crane, the head of ICE's union, claimed that DACA forced them
to choose between enforcing an illegI policy or defying orders from their superiors and risking possible job loss.' 2 The State of Mississippi joined the complaint two months later, arguing that it was injured by the fiscal cost of the "illegal aliens" who were allowed to remain in the State pursuant to the Directive
and the Morton Memo."'3 On January 24, 2013, District Court Judge Reed
O'Connor, a George W. Bush appointee, granted in part and denied in part
Homeland Security's motion to dismiss, finding that Mississippi's asserted fiscal injury was purely speculativell4 and dismissing several of the ICE officers'
claims on standing grounds.' '5 It ruled, however, that the ICE plaintiffs had

109

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012).

110
Letter from Lamar Smith, supra note 18, at 1 (describing new policy as an "amnesty," "an
overreach of executive branch authority," and a "magnet for fraud").
I" ICE Complaint, supra note 20, at 2.

112 Id. at 3.

Amended ICE Complaint, supra note 21, at 3.
114
Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745-46 (N.D. Tex. 2013) ("Mississippi's asserted fiscal injury is purely speculative because there is no concrete evidence that the costs associated with the presence of illegal aliens in the state of Mississippi have increased or will increase
as a result of the Directive or the Morton Memorandum.").
"1s
It dismissed their claims that they would be forced to violate their oath, id. at 736 ("if an
alleged violation of one's oath 'is the only consequence that flows from upholding a challenged
law, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by suggesting that a refusal to uphold the law will result
in injury'); that that they were burdened by having to comply with the law, id. at 738 ("Here, the
ICE Agent Plaintiffs do not suffer any financial burden or harm to their personal property interests by complying with the Directive and the Morton Memorandum and deferring action against
Directive-eligible aliens. They simply must change the way they conduct their duties while performing their jobs as ICE agents."); and that they were injured by USCIS' power to grant work
authorization, id. at 742 (finding no standing to challenge USCIS issuance of employment au"
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constitutional and prudential standing to move forward with their central argument: that they could be disciplined or fired from their jobs because of their refusal to comply with an illegal and unconstitutional policy." 6 On April 23,
2013, the Court found that the ICE plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that DACA violated various interlocking provisions of INA §
23517 but it requested additional briefing on whether it had jurisdiction in light
of the Civil Service Reform Act ("the CSRA")."' Three months later, it dismissed the suit, finding that the CSRA and the collective bargaining agreement
between the ICE union and DHS provided the exclusive means for resolution of
their dispute." 9 At the same time, it scolded the U.S. government for not
properly briefing the issue and for "unreasonably expend[ing] so much of this
Court's time."1 2 0 Kris Kobach claimed victory in the face of this defeat, arguing
that the District Court's April 23 ruling that Crane was likely to prevail on the
merits would remain as precedent.12 1
C.

DA CA and Separationof Powers

DACA and the litigation that has followed raise a number of important
constitutional issues regarding the scope of Executive authority. In light of recent concerns raised by both conservatives and liberals that the Obama Administration has, in many cases, exceeded the scope of Executive power, these arguments warrant serious attention. 122 The often overlapping arguments

thorization where ICE plaintiffs not involved in process and where they failed to articulate how
issuance of employment authorization harmed them personally).
116
Id. at 740-41 (Where ICE Agent Plaintiffs stated intention to engage in a course of conduct
prohibited by rule, Plaintiffs had standing to challenge that rule, even absent a specific threat of
enforcement; where "Plaintiffs [were] asserting their own right to be free from adverse employment consequences" and where "alleged injury is sufficiently concrete, . . . the Court is satisfied
that . .. Plaintiffs were not asserting generalized policy grievances.").
117
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 22, at 1. It seemed
poised to grant injunctive relief, but deferred ruling until the parties had provided additional
briefing on whether the Court lacked jurisdiction on the basis that the suit was barred as a federal
employment dispute subject to the remedies provided by the Civil Service Reform Act. Id. at 19.
118
Id
"
Order, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, at 6 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013) (disat
available
jurisdiction),
of
lack
for
suit
missing
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/27924754/Crane75%207-31-13.pdf
120
Id at 7.
121 Julia Preston, Judge Dismisses Suit to End Deportation Deferrals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2013, at A12.
122
See, e.g., Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's NonEnforcement of Immigration Laws, The Dream Act and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV.
781, 799 (2013) (challenging DACA as violating the "Take Care Clause" on the basis that "it
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surrounding DACA can be classified into at least four familiar types of constitutional claims:
The Youngstown/Curtiss-Wright Dichotomy: whether the Executive's powers in enacting DACA were at their lowest ebb
because the Executive was acting contrary to the will of Congress, or instead whether the President was acting pursuant to
his inherent powers.
The Non-Delegation Doctrine Resurrection: that the Executive
usurped legislative authority by issuing a directive in the absence of "intelligible principles."
The "Take Care" Clause Crisis: that by ordering ICE officers
not to place into removal proceedings DACA-eligible individuals, the Executive violated its duty to see that the immigration
laws were faithfully executed.
The Notice and Comment Myth: that by issuing a directive
with clear eligibility criteria the Administration created a substantive rule requiring notice and comment under the Administrative Procedures Act.
Each of these arguments implicates separation of powers and raises
questions regarding the proper role of the Executive in administering the immigration laws. The first three are largely constitutional, while the fourth derives
from administrative law.
1.

The Youngstown/Curtiss-Wright Dichotomy

The first two arguments are closely-related but distinct, but both address the same question of whether the Executive Branch usurped legislative
authority in promulgating DACA. Indeed, DACA, in setting forth clear eligibility criteria for relief,12 3 differed significantly from the Morton Memo, which set
forth 19 non-exhaustive factors that an ICE officer could consider in deciding
whether to exercise discretion. 124
For anyone versed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube,' 2 5 the famous steel
seizure case which dealt more broadly with the question of whether and when
would be implausible and unnatural to read the Clause as creating a power in the President to deviate from strict enforcement of the laws.").
123
Napolitano Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
124
Morton Memo, supra note 42, at 4.
125
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 701 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
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the President can exercise inherent power, DACA should raise the question of
whether the President's actions were illegal because he was acting contrary to
the will of Congress.126 In Youngstown, the Court ruled that President Harry S.
Truman exceeded the scope of his powers when he ordered the seizure of U.S.
steel mills during the Korean War in order to avoid a work stoppage that could
interfere with the war effort. It found that he was acting neither within the
scope of his powers as Commander in Chiefl2 7 nor his powers as delegated by
Congress.1 28 Both the Court's opinion and several of the concurring opinions,
including Justice Robert Jackson's famous "zone of twilight" concurrence,129
rely on the fact that Congress, during the debate over the Taft-Hartley Act, had
considered and rejected an amendment that would have authorized the President to seize the means of production where a labor dispute threatened curtailment or cessation of production in a pivotal industry.' 3 Critics of DACA, including the ICE officers in their complaint,' 3 ' argue that Congress considered
and rejected various versions of the DREAM Act, whose eligibility criteria
DACA closely mirrors.13 2 Thus, the argument goes, under Jackson's "zone of

Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .").
127
Id. at 587 ("Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has
the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes
from stopping production.").
128
Id. at 585-86.
129
Id. at 634-60. Justice Jackson's famous concurrence posits three distinct scenarios: 1)
"When the President acts pursuant to express or implied authorization [from] Congress," his
power is at its greatest; 2) When the President acts in the absence of Congressional authority,
there is a "zone of twilight" where he and Congress "may have concurrent authority," and where
Congressional "inertia, indifference or quiescence" may justify independent Executive action;
and 3) Where the President acts contrary to the express or implied will of Congress, his power is
"at its lowest ebb." Id. at 634-38.
130
Youngstown consists of Justice Black's opinion of the Court and several concurring opinions, making it difficult to identify exactly where the Court stood on the issue of Executive power. Justice Black's opinion, however, in which Justice Jackson joins, indicates that Executive authority must "stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." Id. at 585. The
Court indicates that there was no statute authorizing the President to take possession of property
nor "any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can
fairly be implied." Id. Several Justices point out that Congress rejected an amendment that would
have authorized such seizures in cases of emergency. See id. at 586 (Black, J.); id. at 600-01
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring). For the floor debate over and
vote on Senator Javits's proposed amendment, see 93 CONG. REc. 3637-45 (1947).
131 ICE Complaint, supra note 20, at 17-18.
132
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 122, at 788-89.
126
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twilight," when the Executive promulgated DACA, it was acting contrary to the
will of Congress.' 33
This analogy, while perhaps superficially appealing, is inapposite. Unlike Taft-Hartley, which was heavily debated before being passed and which
accorded significant powers to Congress to resolve labor disputes, 34 the
DREAM Act was never enacted into law. Notwithstanding majority support at
several key junctures in both houses, Senate cloture rules requiring a supermajority to break a threatened filibuster repeatedly prevented it from coming to
a vote. 135 By comparison, as Justice Felix Frankfurter points out in his concurrence in Youngstown, an amendment providing the President with the authority
to seize a pivotal industry threatened with a work stoppage was "voted down
after debate, by a vote of more than three to one."l 36
It is thus not accurate to say that the Executive was acting contrary to
the will of Congress when it announced DACA. Rather, the promulgation of
DACA in the face of Congressional gridlock arguably falls within Justice Jackson's twilight zone, which allows the President to act in cases of "congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence," particularly where Congress and the Executive enjoy concurrent authority.' 37 The line between Congressional opposition
or inertia and acquiescence is not always a bright one. Indeed, Justice Fred
Vinson suggests in his dissenting opinion that Youngstown was more a case of
Congressional acquiescence, since the President sent a "[m]essage to Congress
stating his purpose to abide by any action of Congress, whether approving or
disapproving his seizure action"l 38 and Congress did not take steps to stop him.
In promulgating DACA, the Executive Branch acted in the face of congressional gridlock and inertia. Rather than taking steps to undo Executive action, immediately after the 2012 elections Congress began to discuss the contours of

I.
134
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 656-60 (Burton, J., concurring).
135 OLIVAS, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND, supra note
67, at 69-71.
136
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 600-01 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also 93 CONG. REC.
3645 (1947).
'
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Margulies, supra note 35,
at 15-16 (arguing that while DACA is not justified as falling within the Executive's prosecutorial
discretion, it may be justified under a stewardship paradigm consistent with Youngstown that allows the President to act provisionally to preserve Congress' ability to legislate and to protect
"intending Americans" from violations by wayward states).
138
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701 (Vinson, J., dissenting). Professor Margulies' stewardship
model, discussed supra text accompanying note 35, seems largely consistent with arguments
made by Justice Vinson in his dissent in Youngstown, who argued that the President's actions
were justified because he kept Congress fully informed, indicated his intent to abide by any action of Congress, and was merely taking temporary action to preserve the defense programs that
Congress had enacted until Congress could act. Id. at 703; see Margulies, supra note 35, at n.66.
133~

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8

280

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

comprehensive immigration reform,13 9 which would eventually include a special fast track to provisional status and permanent residency for DACA recipients.140 In short, the Executive's actions broke the gridlock between the two
branches, spurring a new commitment to reform.
Consideration of Youngstown also raises the question of whether the
President had inherent authority to regulate immigration. Unlike regulation of
the domestic means of production where the Court in Youngstown found that
the President's powers must stem "either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself,"l41 the Court has repeatedly stated that the regulation of
immigration implicates the foreign affairs power.14 2 In their recent study on
ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Enforcement: Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service authors raise the question of whether the President has
extra-constitutional powers to regulate immigration that go beyond powers
specifically delegated because of the implication for foreign affairs.14 3 This
would anchor the regulation of immigration firmly within Justice Jackson's
twilight zone, 1" with possible overlapping authority of both Congress and the
Executive, particularly in light of the fact that there is no specificallyenumerated immigration power in the Constitution.14 5 Thus, under this ap-

139 Preston, supra note 75, at A12.

See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 2102, §§ 2101-2103 (2013) (creating new status of Registered Provisional Immigrants ("RPI") and providing that DACA recipients will be immediately eligible for RPI status
pending a background clearance and for adjustment to lawful permanent residency after five
years, as compared to ten years for most other applicants); see also Michael D. Shear & Ashley
Parker, Senate Group's Immigration Plan Would Alter Waiting Periods, NY TIMES, March 17,
2013, at All (discussing how most noncitizens qualifying under the Senate proposal would have
to wait ten years to obtain lawful permanent residency, but could apply for citizenship three years
after that).
141 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
142
See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 705-07 (1893); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604-06 (1889).
143
See CRS Report, supra note 26, at 3-6; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) ("[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in
the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations .... ).
144 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
145
See, e.g., Knauff 338 U.S. at 542 ("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the Executive
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."). Cf Margulies, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing
that while the Constitution does not mention immigration specifically, where it mentions matters
related to immigration, it consigns them to Congress).
140
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proach, the President could regulate aspects of immigration, particularly those
touching on foreign affairs, even without a specific delegation of authority from
Congress, unless Congress acted to limit him. Even then, this would raise the
question of the extent to which Congress may limit the Executive's exercise of
enforcement discretion when it comes to certain aspects of immigration policy
touching directly on foreign affairs.146
Interestingly, despite precedent decisions and historical practice suggesting the inherent foreign affairs power as a possible source of Executive authority, neither DACA's advocates nor members of the Administration appear
to have relied on this type of "inherent authority" argument to justify DACA,
perhaps in light of the long line of immigration cases where the Executive used
this power arbitrarily and despotically and yet the Court declined to assert its
power of judicial review.147 Moreover, the President's inherent foreign affairs
power identified in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.14 8 stands on
shaky ground, with legal scholars questioning the underlying premise that this
sovereign power over foreign affairs did not depend on its being specifically
enumerated in the Constitution but rather passed from the Crown "to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America."1 4 9 Professor Louis Henkin has pointed to the numerous specific powers
with regard to foreign affairs enjoyed by both Congress and the President 5 0
while other scholars have underscored that before we became one nation, we
were a loose confederation, and that independent states had to give up their

'
One example of this was President Carter's decision in 1980 to parole into the United
States over 100,000 Cubans who arrived during the Mariel boatlift. Congress had just passed the
Refugee Act of 1980, which set forth procedures and numerical limits for admitting refugees as
well as standards for granting asylum. The new law prohibited the Attorney General from paroling a refugee into the United States absent "compelling reasons in the public interest with respect
to that particular alien." Despite this prohibition, President Carter paroled large groups of Cubans
(as well as many Haitian asylum seekers) into the United States in response to what was arguably
an "unforeseen emergency," but using parole as the mechanism seemed contrary to the letter and
spirit of the recently-passed Refugee Act. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 884-86 (5th ed. 2009). Many of these individuals
would eventually qualify for asylum, others were eligible for residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act, others would require special legislation in order to remain, and still others would be
deemed excludable and allowed to remain under Orders of Supervision until they could be returned to Cuba. Still others who were deemed a danger to the community would be subject to
indefinite detention. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and
Impact ofZadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 376-77 (2002).
147
See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215-16; Knauff 338 U.S. at 543; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
714; Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 663-64; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602.
148
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
149
Id. at 316.
150

Louis HENKIN,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
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sovereignty over foreign affairs as a condition of joining the Union."s' Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has side-stepped the issue of
whether the President has inherent authority over foreign affairs by finding that
Conress has authorized or acquiesced in such exercise of Executive authority.
Furthermore, as we will see in Part 3 below, the Executive enjoys constitutionally-based powers to Take Care that the laws are faithfully executed,
consistent with his obligations under Article II.1s3 It is quintessentially an Executive function under the Constitution to enforce the laws. Under a Separation
of Powers approach, this may serve as an additional limit on both Congress'
and the Judiciary's ability to restrict the exercise of enforcement discretion.
2.

The Non-Delegation Doctrine Resurrection

A distinct but related argument concerning the usurpation of Congress'
lawmaking authority is that, even if Congress delegated broad rule-making authority to the Executive with regard to immigration, it did not provide the Executive with "intelligible principles" for making such rules. Indeed, § 103(a)(3)
of the INA gives the Secretary broad authority to "establish such regulations; ... issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as [s]he deems
necessary for carrying out [her] authority under the provisions of this Act."l5 4 If
anything pushed the constitutional envelope, it was arguably this provision of
the INA. The Court has frequently recited that Congress, in delegating lawmaking authority to the Executive, must provide "intelligible principles" by
which the Executive is to exercise its law-making authority. An argument
could be made that § 103(a)(3) did not provide the Executive with such principles.
Since the mid-1930s, however, with the Supreme Court's New Deal
shift to a more expansive interpretation of Congress' powers, virtually every
delegation of lawmaking authority by Congress to the Executive
has been
held, and the non-delegation doctrine has been considered moribund, at best.upSee, e.g., Berger, supra note 40, at 26-33; David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis ofMr. JusticeSutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467,479-90 (1946).
152
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting weaknesses in Government's claim of inherent, extra-statutory authority to detain); see
also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1981) (long continued Executive practice
of settling claims by Executive agreement, acquiesced in by Congress, raises presumption that
actions taken pursuant to Congress' consent).
153
CRS Report, supra note 26, at 16.
154
INA § 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012).
155
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
156
CHEMERINSKY, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 335 (4th ed. 2011).
1
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Indeed, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n.,' the Court reaffirmed the
intelligible principle rule while at the same time upholding a delegation of legislative power to the Environmental Protection Agency and giving numerous
examples of cases where it had found an intelligible principle to exist. "In
short," the Court concluded, "We have 'almost never felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law."'"ss While there has been scholarship over the years calling for a revival of the non-delegation doctrine,15 9 it
seems unlikely that the Court would do so in an immigration matter, where
Congress, since the late nineteenth century, has exercised plenary authority to
regulate immigrants and to delegate power, as it sees fit, to the Executive, with
only limited judicial review.160 Moreover, the argument laid out earlier that the
President also has inherent authority rooted in his foreign affairs power is relevant here as well.16 1 DACA's critics, in arguing that the Executive has usurped
Congress' lawmaking role, have not only attempted to breathe new life into
outmoded constitutional arguments rejected by the Court since the mid-1930s,
but they have also given, at best, limited weight to a long line of immigration
law cases recognizing the special role of both political branches in making and
enforcing the immigration laws.162

531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting with approval Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
159
THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 297-98 (1969) (early proposal that courts revive the nondelegation doctrine to make Congress accountable for major decisions); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 195-97 (1993); Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen Robinson, A Theory ofLegislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,63-67 (1982) (calling for a renewed application of the
non-delegation doctrine); David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L.& PUB.
POL'Y 31 (2013) (calling for revival of robust form of the nondelegation doctrine within administrative law); Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper"Understandingof the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 235, 236 (2005) (arguing that the traditional nondelegation doctrine, while almost never applied properly by government actors, reflects a real
principle embedded in the Constitution).
160
See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United
States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 705-07 (1893); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604-06 (1889).
161
For an excellent discussion of the extent to which both Congress and the President enjoy
broad authority to regulate immigration, see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 31, at 465 et seq.
162
For a thorough exploration of the merits of a more formalist approach to Executive powers
in the context of immigration enforcement and of the relationship between separation of powers
and federal preemption, see Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 107 (arguing that if the Executive's
exercise of enforcement discretion crosses into lawmaking, then it is void under separation-ofpowers principles, and thus cannot qualify for preemption, but that if the Executive's exercise of
158
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The "Take Care" Clause Crisis

DACA critics also argue that the Executive is violating his constitutional duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed" 63 by ordering
ICE officers, pursuant to this directive, not to detain or place into removal proceedings certain otherwise removable individuals who appear to be DACAeligible. 16 4 According to this argument, an officer who feels bound by his duty
to follow the law faces discipline, suspension, and possible job loss if he or she
refuses to follow the Napolitano directive. 165 This position has been taken by
John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, who argue in their piece in the Texas Law Review that "it would be implausible and unnatural to read the Clause as creating
a power in the President to deviate from strict enforcement of the laws."'l6 Indeed, we see this approach in Justice Hugo Black's opinion of the Court in
Youngstown, which takes a more formalistic view of Executive power, finding
that "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." 6 7
In an arguable parallel to DACA, Justice Black wrote that President Truman's
order "does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President."l 68 In the immigration context, these arguments
ignore the central role of the Executive in setting immigration enforcement priorities, the use of various forms of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters for at least half-a-century,169 as well as the Supreme Court's affirmation of
the role of discretion in United States v. Arizona.170 Similarly, in the area of
criminal law, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the "Take Care"
clause has been recognized by the Court as quintessentially an Executive function under the Constitution.' 7 ' Notwithstanding the growth of the Administra-

prosecutorial discretion is not lawmaking, then it has no preemptive effect under the Supremacy
Clause). But see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 31, at 474 n.46 (suggesting that the language in
the line of cases asserting Congress' plenary authority over immigration was motivated in part by
a desire to enforce a more viable theory of the now outmoded nondelegation doctrine).
163
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
16
See ICE Complaint, supra note 20, at 19.
165
See id. at 10-12.
166 Delahunty & Yoo, supranote 122, at 799.
167
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
'

Id. at 588.

See Law Professors' Letter, supra note 45, at 2-3.
170 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
171
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) ("The Attorney General and United
States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They have this
latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge
169
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tive State, the other two branches of the federal government are limited in their
ability to check the Executive in exercising prosecutorial discretion in carrying
out its constitutional role.17 2
More specifically, as David Martin points out in an online piece in the
Yale Law Journal, this argument that DACA is unconstitutional because the
President cannot deviate from strict enforcement of the laws also shows a remarkable (and almost disingenuous) lack of understanding regarding the history and meaning of the three supposedly interlocking provisions upon which the
ICE Plaintiffs rely in their lawsuit.' 73 The ICE Plaintiffs come up with what
David Martin describes as a "syllogistically neat statutory theory" that is "deeply flawed." 74 They rely on three provisions of § 235 of the INA which deal
with the inspection of applicants for admission. One of the provisions, INA §
235(a)(1), is a relatively new addition to the INA, part of a major overhaul of
the immigration laws in 1996. David Martin was General Counsel of the INS at
the time, on leave from the University of Virginia Law School, and was pivotal
in redrawing the line between the grounds of excludability and grounds of deportability at "admission" rather than at "entry."' This resulted in noncitizens
who entered without inspection ("EWIs") being treated upon apprehension as
applicants for admission with fewer procedural protections. Thus, § 235(a)(1)
provides that "an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted ... shall be deemed ... an applicant for admission."' 76
Versions of the other two provisions have been part of the INA at least
since its adoption in 1952.'" They deal with the procedures by which applicants for admission are inspected and admitted by an "examining immigration

his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' As a result,
'[t]he presumption of regularity supports' their prosecutorial decisions and, 'in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official
duties."' (citations omitted)).
172
See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (overturning
use of legislative veto as check on enforcement discretion in immigration matters because it violated bicameralism and presentment). But see Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, PresidentialInaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the
President's refusal to enforce duly-enacted statutes-what they term "Presidential inaction"will often dictate national policy, yet receive virtually none of the checks and balances that apply
to Presidential action).
173
David Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy
Flaws in Kris Kobach's Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L. J. ONLINE 167, 169 (Dec. 2012), available
at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/l119.pdf.
174
Id.
175 The proposal to draw the line at admission was originally advanced in T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POL'Y 342-47 (1st ed. 1985).
76

177

INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
Martin, supra note 173, at 177.
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officer" and detained and placed into proceedings if they are not "clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted."178 Traditionally, these provisions were
applied to "arriving aliens" stopped at a port of entry or otherwise detained
while attempting to make an illegal entry.179 Section 235(a)(3) provides that
"[a]ll aliens ... who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or readmission ... shall be inspected by immigration officers."' 8 Section
235(b)(2)(A) provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240."s18' The ICE officers challenging DACA read these three provisions together as mandating that ICE must
detain and place into removal proceedings any apprehended noncitizens who
entered without inspection because they are deemed to be applicants for admission who are not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.182 In his
April decision in Crane v. Napolitano, District Court Judge Reed O'Connor
was persuaded by the ICE plaintiffs' argument based on his own textualist
analysis of the various provisions in INA § 235 but gave virtually no attention
to the legislative history or the context in which the 1996 changes were adopted.183 In a footnote, he criticized the Government for its "cursory analysis of the
issue" and found that it had not "sufficiently presented the statutory construction issue to the Court for determination." 1 84
Martin's article, which was not referenced in the Court's decision, explained in some depth why this interpretation of INA § 235 was not consistent
with Congress' intent and would lead to absurd results if implemented. The
language deeming aliens who had not been inspected and admitted to be "applicants for admission" was included to avoid situations where an EWI might
claim during removal proceedings that he was not applying for admission and
thus not removable. Martin indicates that this provision was designed to increase enforcement discretion with regard to whether to place EWIs into removal proceedings, not to cabin it.' 8 5 Moreover, strict application of the rule
would lead to absurd results where officers, in order to pick up every EWI they
17
17
Iso

INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012).
Martin, supra note 173, at 179-80.
INA § 235(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (2012).

INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
ICE Complaint, supra note 20, at 9.
183
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 22, at 11-19. The Court
deferred ruling on the ICE Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction until the parties had
provided the Court with additional briefing regarding the effect of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the Civil Service Reform Act on the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at 37.
184
Id. at 7 n.8.
185
Martin, supra note 173, at 177.
182
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encountered, would have to ignore federal enforcement priorities and directives
from their superiors. 6 Martin emphasizes that it is the agency, not each individual enforcement officer, who must make decisions about resource allocation
and broader policy concerns.' 87
This analysis is also consistent with the Court's approach to selective
prosecution claims, both in the criminal and agency context. The Court has said
that it is the "special province" of the Executive to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed" and that such claims challenging prosecutorial discretion
are generally unsuitable for judicial review.188 In the agency context, the Court
has found that agencies are "better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities."
Indeed, where a statute is ambiguous on its face, Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council" requires that an agency's interpretation of
that statute be entitled to deference. The relationship among the various provisions of INA § 235 is, at a minimum, ambiguous. The requirement that an "alien seeking admission [who] is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted ... shall be detained"' 9 ' arguably only applies to so called "arriving
aliens" attempting an entry, and not to EWIs, who are only "deemed to be" applicants for admission. The language in INA § 235(b)(2)(A) refers to the role of
the "examining immigration officer" in determining whether "an alien seeking
admission" is entitled to be admitted. This language has repeatedly been used
in the regulations to reference the "examining immigration officer" at a port of
entry, not ICE agents in the field.19 2 Furthermore, the regulations implementing
this provision apply the mandatory detention provision only to arriving aliens,
not to noncitizens who previously entered without inspection and admission.193
The district court's entire analysis as to why DACA is beyond the scope of
Executive power hinges, despite this ambiguity, on its conclusion that the inter-

186

See id.at 183-84.

Id. at 183.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
18 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
190
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
191 INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added); see also CRS Report, supra note 26, at 22.
192
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(b) (providing rules for inspection of arriving aliens at ports of
entry by examining immigration officers as well as at other entry points); 8 C.F.R. § 235.2(b)
(providing that examining immigration officer may defer further examination where an alien
seeking admission may be eligible for parole); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2) (setting forth role of examining immigration officer in processing applicants for admission subject to expedited removal).
193
See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) ("[A]ny arriving alien who appears to the inspecting officer to be
inadmissible, and who is placed in removal proceedings pursuant to section 240 of the Act shall
be detained in accordance with section 235(b) of the Act.").
187

188
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locking provisions of INA § 235 must be read together to eliminate prosecutorial discretion when it comes to the detention of EWIs and their placement into
proceedings.
This interpretation is not only contrary to the structure and purpose of
the 1996 immigration reforms, but also to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
less than a year earlier in Arizona v. United States.' 94 The Supreme Court, in
upholding § 2B while striking down the other provisions, reaffirmed the central
role of the federal government in setting enforcement priorities. It is worth repeating the quote from the beginning of this piece:
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces
immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to
support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than
alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States,
long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy
choices that bear on this Nation's international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails
to meet the criteria for admission.'9 5
This language, read in the context of the Court's decision on S.B. 1070,
suggests that discretion is not just a power for the immigration judge to exercise in deciding whether an immigrant in removal proceedings is eligible for
discretionary relief. Rather, as INS Commissioner Doris Meissner recognized
over ten years ago in issuing guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,' 96 it is a function to be exercised from the very beginning in deciding
whether to place a noncitizen into proceedings.197 It does not just involve application of the law to the equities in a formal adjudication. It involves policy
judgments about who to detain and who to remove. 198 If executive officers like
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2499.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r of Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memo],
available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-materials/immigration/ enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justice/govemment-documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-MemoProsecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-l 1-7-00.pdf/view.
'
See id. at 3, 5.
198
Since the 1996 reforms and since the Meissner Memo laid out criteria for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, Congress, despite legislating in other areas of immigration law, has not
overturned the Executive's exercise of enforcement discretion with regard to EWIs, thus putting
a legislative gloss on whether the mandatory detention rules in INA § 235(b)(2)(A) for persons
194

19
196
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John Morton and Janet Napolitano can make these policy choices, they must
have the power to be able to instruct their officers in the field to enforce these
priorities and to discipline them if they disobey orders. The ICE Plaintiffs have
argued, incredibly, that they can disregard the orders of their superiors and take
the law, as they interpret it, into their own hands.199
4.

The Notice and Comment Myth

The ICE Complaint claims that the DACA directive violates the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") through conferral of a benefit without
proper notice and comment. 200 The basic argument seems to be that DACA sets
forth clear eligibility criteria and confers a benefit (in the form of deferred action and work authorization) on those who meet the criteria. In so doing, it is
"quintessentially a 'rule' under the Administrative Procedures Act." 201 The Secretary, the argument goes, has not issued a notice of proposed rulemaking or
promulgated a final rule. Thus, the directive is not a rule under the APA.202
In the same short paragraph, the ICE Plaintiffs argue both that DACA
is "quintessentially a 'rule' under the APA, and at the same time that the
"[d]irective is not a rule." 203 It is unclear whether this confusing paragraph is
the result of poor draftsmanship, disingenuousness about the rulemaking process, or an inadequate understanding of administrative law and the role of legislative and nonlegislative rules. Although the use of policy memoranda and
guidelines by legacy INS and by USCIS and ICE has been the subject of frequent criticism as evading notice and comment procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act, 20 4 it has been in use for years. It arguably falls within

"seeking admission" were intended to apply to EWIs once they were "deemed. . . applicants for
admission" under INA § 235(a)(1). See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661-62
(1981) (long continued Executive practice, acquiesced in by Congress, raises presumption that
actions taken pursuant to Congress' consent).
19 But see Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2008)
(Louisiana Commissioner lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of state law which he
alleged violated Constitution); Finch v. Miss. State Med. Ass'n, Inc., 585 F.2d 765, 775 (5th Cir.
1978) (Mississippi governor lacked standing to challenge state law whose enforcement, he believed, would cause him to violate his oath).
200
ICE Complaint, supra note 20, at 19.
201 Id. at 20.
202
203

204

Id
Id.
See Questions and Answers: USCIS American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)

Meeting, March 19, 2009, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.

SERV. 2-3 (March 19, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/aila
aaoqa 19march09.pdf.
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the "general statement of policy" exception to rule-making under the APA 205
and more specifically, the Secretary of Homeland Security's powers under §
103(a)(3) to "establish such regulations; ... issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as [s]he deems necessary for carrying out [her] authority
under the provisions of this Act." 206
DACA no doubt created a new rule for conferring deferred action on
certain childhood arrivals otherwise subject to removal, but that begs the question of whether it amounted to a legislative rule with binding effect requiring
notice and comment rulemaking, or simply guidance to immigration officers in
exercising their prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the immigration laws. In
applying the general statement of policy exception, the D.C. Circuit, whose test
has been the most generally followed, has looked to whether the rule is legally
binding or leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion, how the Agency has
characterized the rule, the language used in the rule itself, and whether the rule
has been published in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations.207
The Napolitano Memo emphasizes that the criteria for relief must be
satisfied "before an individual is considered for an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion . . . ."208 The last paragraph of the Directive emphasizes that it "confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship."209 Subsequently, in notices published on the Department of Homeland Security website, the agency has emphasized that DACA recipients do not enjoy "lawful
immigration status," but at the same time, will not be treated as "unlawfully
present." 2 10 Including this language does not, of course, definitively resolve the
question of whether DACA violated the APA. Courts, in considering this issue,
may look at the extent to which the new guidance was mandatory for field of-

205
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). In Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), the D.C. Circuit cites to the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), which defines "general statements of policy" under the APA as "statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes
to exercise a discretionary power." Id.
206
INA § 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).

207
See William Funk, When is a "Rule" a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between NonLegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 659, 662-63 (2002).
208
Napolitano Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
209

Id. at 3.
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DACA FAQs], http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac8924
3c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextchannel=3a4dbc4b044993 IOVgnVCM 1OOOOO82ca6aRCRD&vgnextoi
d=3a4dbc4b04499310 VgnVCMLOOOOO082ca6OaRCRD ("although deferred action does not
confer a lawful immigration status, your period of stay is authorized by the Department of Homeland Security while your deferred action is in effect and, for admissibility purposes, you are considered to be lawfully present in the United States during that time").
210
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ficerS2 1' and at how many individuals who otherwise met the criteria were not
granted deferred action, to see whether DHS intended the memo to be binding
on its officers.2 12 On the other hand, DHS may still be able to argue that, even if
binding on its field agents, this involves prosecutorial discretion rather than the
creation of a formal legal status, thus falling within the "general statement of
policy" exception.
In earlier sections, I have underscored the reluctance of advocates and
policymakers to rely on an inherent foreign affairs powers argument in justifying DACA.213 Nonetheless, this type of argument may be particularly useful as
a defense to the notice and comment claim. The APA contains an explicit exception to notice and comment rulemaking where it involves "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States."214 Announcing DACA without notice and comment is arguably consistent with the broader authority the
Executive has enjoyed in issuing immigration rules in light of their implications
for foreign affairs. While some have argued against applying the foreign affairs
exception loosely in the immigration context, particularly where there is no obvious link to foreign affairs,215 it has frequently been invoked in rulemaking.2 16
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona underscoring the impact of
immigration regulation on foreign affairs, if it can be shown that DACA had
major foreign policy implications that were considered in drafting the rule, it
may also fit within the foreign affairs exception.

The Directive, as applied to ICE officers who encounter DACA-eligible individuals in the
field or in the context of removal proceedings, is quite specific with regard to what they are instructed to do. Id. at 2.
212
Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (so-called policy
statement that in purpose or effect narrowly limits administrative discretion will be taken for a
binding rule of substantive law).
213
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
214
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012).
215 See Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 164; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REv. 1, 60-61
(2012) (arguing that deferred action should be subject to notice and comment rulemaking).
216
See, e.g., Final Rule, Designation of Taiwan for the Visa Waiver Program, 77 Fed. Reg.
64409, 64410 (Oct. 22, 2012) ("DHS is of the opinion that this final rule is also excluded from
the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 as a foreign affairs function of the United States,
because it advances the President's foreign policy goals"); Final Rule, Visas: Issuance of Full
Validity L Visas to Qualified Applicants, 77 Fed. Reg. 8119 (Feb. 14, 2012) (invoking foreign
affairs exception to notice and comment rule-making); Final Rule, Visas: Documentation of
Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 23477
(April 27, 2011) (invoking foreign affairs exception). But see Final Rule, Provisional Unlawful
Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 536 (Jan. 3,
2013) (rulemaking subject to Notice & Comment).
211
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DA CA and CongressionalLimits

While the U.S. Senate was busy preparing to debate comprehensive
immigration reform on the Senate floor, on June 6, 2013, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed an amendment to H.R. 2217, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2014, by a vote of 224 to 201 to prevent
any government funds from being used to implement DACA or the Morton
Memo.217 It later passed H.R. 2217 by a vote of 245-182.218 In supporting the
amendment, Rep. Steve King (R-IA) made a telling comment: "We initiated
this litigation. We're moving it through the court system. But we can never
catch up through the litigation process the things that the President has usurped
that are the legislative authority that we have."219
An interesting question arises as to whether this was an example of
Congress asserting a legitimate check on Executive power, or whether this
amendment was part of a broader legal strategy. Rep. King's use of "we" suggests the latter. Indeed, the Crane lawsuit, efforts in Congress to defund
DACA, and, as seen below, states' denial of driver's licenses to DACA recipients, might all be best understood as part of a multi-pronged strategy to thwart
the Administration's use of prosecutorial discretion as an enforcement tool. 22 0
III. A SOLUTION TO THE FEDERALISM CRISIS?
ARIZONA AND THE DREAMERS

A.

Arizona v. United States: Textbook Preemption

In Arizona v. United States, a clear majority of the Court applied textbook preemption principles to strike down three of the four provisions of S.B.
1070 and to raise serious concerns regarding the fourth. The decision invoked
both field and obstacle preemption principles in striking down §§ 3, 5(C) and
6.221 Reaffirming Hines v. Davidowitz,2 22 the classic 1941 decision overturning
Pennsylvania's alien registration law, it found that § 3 of S.B. 1070, which
made it a state misdemeanor for a noncitizen to fail to register under federal
immigration law, wasfield preempted, because Congress had adopted a "single
integrated and all embracing system" that precluded the states from "compleSee 159 CONG. REC. H3325 (2013) (vote to defund DACA and Morton Memo).
See H.R. 2217, 113th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, June 6, 2013).
219
159 CONG. REC. H3210 (daily ed. June 5, 2013) (statement of Rep. King) (emphasis added); see also id. at H3208-3212, 3222, 3225 (amendment, debate and vote to defund DACA).
220 Julia Preston, Deportations UnderNew US. Policy Are Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13,
2011, at A16 (discussing ICE officer obstruction to implementation of Morton memo).
221 See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
222
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
217

218
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,,223

The
ment[ing] federal law or enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations.
majority raised concerns that if Arizona's provision were upheld, then "every
state could give itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations ...

224

In striking down on obstacle preemption grounds § 5(C), the provision
making it a crime for a noncitizen to solicit, apply for or work without authorization, the Court examined the text, structure and legislative history of the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") in determining Congressional
purpose, thus backtracking somewhat from Chamber of Commerce v. Whit-

ing, 22 5 where it expressed skepticism about using legislative history to interpret
the meaning of the express preemption provision.226 In Arizona, it found that in
passing IRCA, Congress made a "deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment,"2 2 7 and that
a state law criminalizing the workers themselves was an obstacle to the regulatory regime Congress had chosen.22 8
Similarly, in striking down on obstacle preemption grounds § 6, the
provision allowing for warrantless arrests of noncitizens who commit removable offenses, it found that Arizona had attempted to give its own officers greater authority to enforce the immigration laws than Congress had given to trained
federal immigration officers. 22 9 Federal law creates limited situations where
state and local authorities can enforce federal immigration laws, such as pursuant to § 287(g) agreements that provide for the certification and adequate training of state officers. 23 0 By authorizing state officers to decide whether a noncitizen should be detained for being removable, Arizona violated the principle that
such enforcement decisions should be left up to the federal government.

Id. at 2495 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67, 74).
224
Id. at 2502.
225
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
226
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (quoting Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275, 1283 n.4 (2002)). The Court in Whiting described
the House Report as "a rather slender reed" from "one House of a politically divided Congress."
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, upheld the challenged provisions of the Legal Arizona Workers Act, concluding that Arizona's licensing scheme was not
preempted by federal law since Arizona had taken the route least "likely to cause tension with
federal law" by relying on federal standards in targeting employers who employ unauthorized
workers. Id. at 1987.
227 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.
223

228
229
230
231

Id. at 2505.
Id.
INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012).
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
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Finally, while the Court found that § 2(B), the "show me your papers"
provision, was not unconstitutional on its face, it left open the possibility that it
could be challenged as applied, particularly in situations involving racial profiling and violations of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. 23 2 Section 2(B) requires that state officers make a "reasonable attempt" to determine the immigration status of anyone they stop, detain or arrest where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully
present.233 The Court interpreted this provision narrowly to only apply where
state authorities detain an individual pursuant to an otherwise legitimate stop or
arrest.2323 It indicated that it would raise constitutional difficulties if § 2(B) were
utilized to detain individuals solely for an immigration violation or for purposes
of verifying their immigration status, or if an otherwise lawful detention for a
traffic violation, for example, were prolonged beyond the time required to conduct a lawful stop.235 At some point, the Court indicated, a reasonable stop
could turn into an unlawful seizure triggering greater Fourth Amendment protections.236 Although the Court suggested that law enforcement could take an
individual into custody if there were independent criminal grounds for doing
so, it said that it would "disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in
the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without
federal direction and supervision." 237
Perhaps most significantly for future cases, despite Arizona's arguments that the challenged provisions were not preempted because they mirrored
federal immigration law, the majority appears to have rejected this theory as
well as the notion that Arizona was simply cooperating in enforcement. In
striking down § 6, the Court wrote:
There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of
the term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state of-

232
233
234

See id. at 2509.
2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 113 § 2(B) (West) (S.B. 1070).
Id.

Id. at 2509.
Id. at 2516 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
237
Id. at 2497. It is worth noting here that the Ninth Circuit struck down all four provisions,
with the three-person panel unanimously overturning the provisions making it a state crime to fail
to "complete or carry" a federal alien registration document or to seek or engage in unauthorized
employment. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 354-57 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 845 (Dec. 12, 2011). Judge Bea would also have upheld §§ 2(B) and 6. Id. at 369-91. His
position on §§ 2(B) and 6 thus coincided with Justice Alito's position on these provisions. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (Alito, J., concurring and dissenting).
235

236
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ficers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request,
approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.23 8
The majority's deference in Arizona to Congress and the Executive
with regard to immigration enforcement and its articulation of the serious foreign policy consequences of patchwork state and local immigration laws contrasted with the Court's posture during oral argument in April, when Solicitor
General Donald Verilli, Jr. was peppered with questions regarding the federal
government's failure to enforce the immigration laws:
Scalia, J.: "[T]he [federal] Government can set forth the rules
concerning who belongs in this country. But if, in fact, somebody who does not belong in this country is in Arizona, Arizona has-has no power? What-what does sovereignty mean if
it does not include the ability to defend your borders?"
Roberts, C.J.: "And what the state is saying, here are people
who are here in violation of Federal law, you make the decision. And if your decision is you don't want to prosecute those
people, fine, that's entirely up to you. That's why I don't see
the problem with section 2(B)."
Sotomayor, J.: "[W]e're going to stay just in 2(B), if the [federal] government says, we don't want to detain the person, they
have to be released for being simply an illegal alien, what's
wrong with that?"
Alito, J.: "How can a state officer who stops somebody or who
arrests somebody for a nonimmigration offense tell whether
that person falls within the Federal removal priorities without
making an inquiry to the Federal government?" 239
In response, during oral argument, Solicitor General Verilli identified
three different groups who were subject to state immigration regulations: 1)
those within the federal government's enforcement priorities, such as immigrants with serious criminal convictions or persons previously deported; 2)
those in some sort of twilight or quasi-legal status, like applicants for asylum,
U visas or adjustment of status; and 3) those without legal status, including illegal entrants not within the federal government's enforcement priorities who

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, 41, 45-46, 52-53, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No.
11-182), availableat www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argumenttranscripts/1 1-182.pdf.
238

239
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might eventually benefit from some sort of legalization program. 240 According
to Solicitor General Verilli, the challenged sections of Arizona's S.B. 1070 interfered with federal enforcement priorities regarding the last two categories.
While Arizona argued that it was merely cooperating in enforcing federal immigration law, the Court focused on the statement of purpose in S.B.
1070's preamble, which was to adopt a policy of "attrition through enforcement" by discouraging and deterring the 1) unlawful entry; 2) unlawful presence; and 3) economic activity of undocumented immigrants. 2 4 1 The Court ultimately concluded that Arizona was not just cooperating in enforcement, but
was essentially enforcing its own immigration policy. Even Justice Samuel
Alito, while embracing the warrantless arrest provision in § 6 of S.B. 1070,
conceded that if the state persists in detaining an individual that the federal
government has communicated is not within its enforcement priorities, this
would not be cooperative enforcement.
In evaluating S.B. 1070, it is useful to break down its purposes into
these three distinct goals and identify the means chosen for achieving these
goals. This can be represented by the following chart. The boxes with an "X"
indicate those situations where the means chosen appear rationally related to
achieving the particular state goal. Thus, § 2(B)'s "show me your papers" provision was targeted at identifying not just persons unlawfully present, but also
illegal entrants and persons working without authorization. It was intended to
work hand-in-hand with the other provisions by giving state and local officers
the authority to arrest and detain noncitizens for having committed a range of
immigration violations.

Id. at 68-69. But see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Memo andProsecutorialDiscretion:
An
Overview,
IMMIG.
POL'Y
CTR.,
3-4
(July
20,
2011),
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2011,0805-wadhia.pdf (indicating that June 2010 ICE Memo includes recent illegal entrants as an enforcement priority).
241
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
240
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The majority resolved the question of what power the state has to "cooperate" with federal immigration authorities by upholding §2(B) on its face
while striking down §§ 3, 5(C), and 6. It concluded that states can require law
enforcement officers to attempt to verify a person's immigration status pursuant
to an otherwise lawful stop and to communicate that information to federal authorities,242 but that they should stay out of the business of arresting noncitizens
for immigration violations, absent specific authorization from federal authorities.243 The Court's decision, while leaving § 2(B) intact, weakened its impact.
By striking down §§ 3, 5(C), and 6, the Court limited states' ability to turn certain federal offenses into state crimes or to arrest an individual for civil violations of federal immigration law. If the State could not make it a crime for a
noncitizen to work without authorization or fail to carry immigration documents, it would lose its basis for taking the noncitizen into custody pursuant to
an otherwise lawful stop. Reasonable suspicion would justify checking immigration status, but not prolonging the detention or making an arrest.2 44 Similarly, without § 6, state law enforcement authorities could not make an arrest
based solely on the immigration violation.2 45

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A) (2012).
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.
244
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
245
While "illegal entry" is a crime under federal immigration law, "unlawful presence" and
working without authorization are not. Thus, the arrest powers under § 6, even if they had been
upheld, could not have been used to further Arizona's last two goals, and would have put un242

243
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The Court did not find it necessary to address whether "illegal entry," a
federal crime, could be made a state crime, thus, justifying a noncitizen's arrest
where probable cause could be established during the initial stop.2 46 Under §
2(B), this would provide a basis to continue to detain the noncitizen until his or
her immigration status had cleared. The Court did suggest, however, that making an arrest based solely on an immigration violation would raise serious constitutional concerns.24 7 Without the power to charge undocumented immigrants
with state immigration offenses or to arrest them for violations of federal immigration law, state officials are limited to stopping and arresting immigrants
only if they have an independent basis under state law for doing so.
Ultimately, by acknowledging the central role of the federal government in immigration enforcement while upholding § 2(B), the Court sent mixed
signals to the states. While the Court validated prosecutorial discretion and federal enforcement priorities, these "show me your papers" laws preserve a role,
as Professor Motomura has pointed out, for state and local officers (as well as
rogue ICE agents) to define the parameters of immigration enforcement. 248 JUStice Alito, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, in an apparent allusion to
Professor Motomura's work, disagreed, writing that "the discretion that ultimately matters is not whether to verify a person's immigration status but
whether to act once the person's status is known." 249 According to this argument, the discretion that matters is what federal authorities do once state authorities notify them that they have an undocumented immigrant in custody.250
Although the Court did not specifically deal with the relationship among the
various provisions in INA § 235 as applied to EWIs, both the majority as well
as Justice Alito in his concurrence rely heavily on their determination that, even
if state or local officers report that they have detained unlawful entrants or other immigration violators, the Executive Branch retains enforcement discretion
in deciding whether to take action against such individuals.25 1 It is difficult to
trained state and local law enforcement officers in the position of analyzing federal immigration
law to determine whether the noncitizen had committed a removable offense.
246
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509. Hiroshi Motomura has thoughtfully addressed some of the enforcement problems raised by giving states the power to criminalize federal immigration violations. See MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 29, at 68-73; Motomura, The
Discretion That Matters, supra note 29, at 1825-26.
247
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.
248
See Motomura, The Discretion That Matters, supra note 29, at 1848 (arguing that the discretion that matters is initial decision to check individual's immigration status, because it is that
decision that sets relentless wheels of immigration removal in motion).
249
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2526 (Alito, J., dissenting).
250
But see MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 29, at 118 (arguing that
if Justice Alito is right, federal discretion to not enforce limits the ability of state and local police,
through ordinary stops and arrests, to make immigration law on the ground).
251
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 239, at 41, 45-46.
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reconcile this analysis with the ICE plaintiffs' arguments in Crane v. Napolitano or with the district court's decision in April 2013.252
Arizona v. United States was a watershed decision because it reaf-

firmed a model of federalism that accords deference to Congress in regulating
immigration and in delegating broad rule-making authority to the Executive.
The dissenting justices, in contrast, would have embraced a shared sovereignty
model of federalism that would have shown much greater deference to Arizona's efforts to deter illegal immigration-what Arizona legislators described as
"attrition through enforcement."2 53 Justice Scalia spoke repeatedly of states' inherent sovereign authority to control their borders,254 described Arizona as being under siege,255 equated illegal entrants with invaders,2 56 and argued that the
founders' original intent was to enable the States to regulate immigration and
prevent "the intrusion of obnoxious aliens .... 257 Justice Alito argued more
narrowly that it would give the federal government unprecedented power if it
could preempt state law based on federal enforcement priorities alone.258
The majority, in contrast, emphasized throughout the relationship between regulating immigration and foreign policy concerns. This discussion was
notably absent from the Ninth Circuit's opinion, although it was the focus of
259
as
Judge John Noonan's concurrence. It was also a focus of amici briefs cited
by the Court, including a brief filed by Argentina and another by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.260 Responding to Justice Scalia's central argument that individual states have inherent sovereignty to control their borders,
the Court writes, "It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the
status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to

252
253

254

Memorandum Opinion and Order, Crane v. Napolitano, supra note 22, at 11-19.
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
Arizona, 132. S.Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

255

Id. at 2522.

256

Id.

Id. at 2512 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 27, 1782), in
1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 226 (1900)). Furthermore, Justices Scalia and Thomas
would have only found preemption where federal law expressly preempts state law or where state
law is in direct conflict with federal law. Arizona, 132 S.Ct at 2514, 2522 (Scalia, J., and Thomas
J., dissenting).
258
Id at 2528 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito would have placed greater weight on the
presumption against preemption where the federal government regulates in an area of traditional
state concern, such as employment or the enforcement of criminal laws. Id. at 2524-35 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
259
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 367-69 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring).
260 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
257
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confer and communicate on this subject with one national government, not the
50 separate States."2 6 1
While focusing on the foreign policy consequences of patchwork immigration laws, the majority also underscored the ties that bind many immigrants to our communities, raising concerns regarding immigrants caught up in
the dragnet of state and local enforcement efforts.262 Its language hearkened
back to Justice William Brennan's famous opinion in Plyer v. Doe, striking
down a Texas law precluding undocumented children from attending public
school.263 The Court in so doing, appeared to embrace a model of immigration,
what Professor Motomura calls "immigration as affiliation," 264 that would offer
a pathway to legal status to undocumented persons who have put down roots,
raised families, and shown themselves to be reliable and productive members
of society. 265 It is a model consistent with the cornerstone goals of comprehensive immigration reform. The Court's decision thus implicates how lower
courts should address the legal issues surrounding DACA, the federal government's prosecutorial discretion policy, ongoing state and local enforcement efforts, and the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform.
B.

The Impact ofDA CA on "Show Me Your Papers"Laws and Other
State Policies

The Court in Arizona during oral argument suggested that federal enforcement priorities alone may not have preemptive effect.266 It acknowledged,
however, that there may be twilight statuses, like applicants for asylum, U visas
or adjustment of status, deferred action, or extended voluntary departure, where
people may be considered "lawfully present" even though they lack formal legal status. 6 7 Indeed, over the years, deferred action has been one of many twilight statuses utilized by the immigration authorities where beneficiaries enjoy

261

Id
Id. at 2502.
263
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
264 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (2006) [hereinafter MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN
WAITING]; MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 29, at 155-156 (on file with
author).
265
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS INWAITING, supra note 264, at 11.
266
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
267
This suggestion is consistent with arguments made by Michael Olivas and others that there
are PRUCOL ("permanently residing under color of law") statuses in the immigration laws
where persons do not have legal status but are still deemed to be lawfully present and potentially
eligible for certain state and federal benefits. See Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act,
and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J. C. & U. L. 435, 454 (2004).
262
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temporary relief from removal, (often) eligibility for work authorization, and
(sometimes) the prospect of lawful residency. In announcing DACA, the Administration effectively moved DACA-eligible individuals from Solicitor General Verilli's third priority group, those noncitizens without legal status, including illegal entrants who are not within the federal government's enforcement
priorities, into his second group, those in some sort of twilight or quasi-legal
status. Deferred action appeared intended to immunize DACA recipients from
state and local efforts to enforce the immigration laws against them."6
The Administration attempted to address the continuing threat of state
and local enforcement against DACA recipients by making such individuals eligible for issuance of an employment authorization document ("EAD").269 In
theory, the possession of an unexpired EAD would prove sufficient to rebut any
suspicion-reasonable or otherwise-by state or local police that the person
was not lawfully present; it would also serve as a basis under most state laws
adopted in conformity with the federal REAL ID Act to grant such recipients of
deferred action driver's licenses.270
The response from the States to DACA has been illuminating and illustrates that the federalism crisis is far from over. Just a few examples should suffice. While a majority of states are granting driver's licenses to recipients of deferred action under DACA, 271 both the Governors of Arizona and Michigan
initially announced that they would not because the Napolitano Memo stated
that DACA conferred no substantive right or immigration status. 2 72 Therefore,

268 But see Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 106 (arguing that if the Executive's exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not lawmaking, then it has no preemptive effect under the Supremacy
Clause).
269 See Napolitano Memo, supra note 14, at 3.
270
The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302, established federal
standards for state issuance of driver's licenses, providing that a state must require evidence of
lawful status before issuing a driver's license, which was defined to include proof of U.S. citizenship, lawful permanent resident status, conditional residency, a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant
visa, an approved application for asylum or refugee status, a pending or approved application for
temporary protected status, approved deferred action status, or a pending application for adjustment of status. Id. at § 202(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Passage of the REAL ID Act also suggested that the issuance of driver's licenses, traditionally a matter of state concern, had acquired a
federal dimension, thus implicating preemption principles and the reach of the Supremacy
Clause. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 12, at 639-40.
271 Are Individuals Granted DeferredAction Under the DeferredAction for Childhood Arrivals (DA CA) Policy Eligiblefor Driver's Licenses?, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (June
19, 2013), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=831 (indicating that 45 states have either confirmed that DACA recipients are eligible for driver's licenses or have been issuing licenses to
persons in this group).
272
See Janice K. Brewer, Ariz. Exec. Order 2012-06, Re-affirming Intent of Arizona Law in
Response to the Federal Government's Deferred Action Program (Aug. 15, 2013) available at
http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/EO_081512_2012-06.pdf; Charlsie Dewey, State Will Not
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these States concluded, recipients were not lawfully present and not eligible for
driver's licenses. The ACLU and MALDEF sued the Arizona Governor in late
November on behalf of DACA recipients, arguing that Arizona's policy was
preempted by federal law and violated equal protection because Arizona granted driver's licenses to all other deferred action recipients, and that Arizona
could not, under federal preemption, come up with its own definition of lawful
presence that did not match the federal definition.273 A similar lawsuit was
brought against the Secretary of State of Michigan.2 74
When the federal government clarified the Napolitano Memo to confirm that DACA recipients would be considered "lawfully present" under the
immigration laws even though DACA conferred no substantive rights or legal
status,275 the State of Michigan reversed its position, announcing that, in light
of the federal government's lawful presence determination, it would provide
driver's licenses to persons granted deferred action under DACA.276 In May
2013, in response to a motion to dismiss filed by the State of Arizona, the District Court dismissed the challengers' preemption arguments but upheld their
equal protection claim.2 77 It found that federal enforcement priorities alone
could not preempt state laws regulating the issuance of driver's licenses, 2 78 but
that the State of Arizona had no rational basis for denying driver's licenses to
persons eligible for relief under DACA while granting them to other similarlysituated immigrants who had received EADs. 2 79 Analyzing at length what level
of scrutiny to apply, it concluded that rational basis with a bite was the appro-

GrantDriver's Licenses to DACA Immigrants, GRAND RAPIDS Bus. J. (Oct. 19, 2012), available
at http://www.grbj.com/articles/74634-state-will-not-grant-drivers-licenses-to-daca-immigrants.
273 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v.
Brewer, 12CV-02546, 2013 WL 2128315 (D. Ariz. Nov. 29, 2012) [hereinafter ADAC Complaint].
274
Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief, One Mich. v. Johnson, 12-CV155551 (E.D. Mich., Dec. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1.
275
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
276 Niraj Warikoo, Michigan Secretary of State Does U-Turn: Will GrantDriver's Licenses to
Qualifying Immigrants, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Feb.
1, 2013,
available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20130201/NEWS06/130201083/Michigan-secretary-of-state-doesU-turn-will-grant-driver-s-licenses-to-qualifying-immigrants.
277
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV12-02546, 2013 WL 2128315, at *24-25 (D.
Ariz., May 16, 2013). In late March 2013, Governor Brewer argued that Arizona did not have to
issue driver's licenses to DACA recipients granted deferred action, because DACA was an abuse
of Executive power. Fernanda Santos, State Defends Immigrant License Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2012, at A13.
278 See Brewer, 2013 WL 2128315, at *7.
279
Id.at*18.
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priate standard, particularly where Governor Janice Brewer's actions appeared
to be driven by her opposition to DACA as a "backdoor amnesty." 280
A final troubling example involves the State of North Carolina. The
Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") announced that it would issue driver's
licenses to DACA recipients after first requesting a legal opinion from the State
Attorney General, who concluded in February 2013 that DACA recipients were
legally present and thus eligible for driver's licenses. The DMV initially announced that it would issue driver's licenses to DACA recipients but that the
license would include a prominent pink strip and the words "NO LAWFUL
STATUS" directly above the person's name. 2 8 1 The ACLU challenged the policy as "stigmatiz[ing] people who are in the U.S. legally with an unnecessary
marker that could lead to harassment, confusion, and racial profiling." 2 82 North
Carolina ultimately relented on the pink strip but the license states on its face in
red letters directly above the driver's name: "LEGAL PRESENCE NO
LAWFUL STATUS."28 3
The district court's decision in the Arizona case and the matter in North
Carolina underscore that questions regarding the scope of federal preemption in
immigration matters are far from settled, and that litigants need to pursue both
preemption claims as well as equal protection arguments in confronting state
and local laws targeted at noncitizens without formal legal status. The State of
Arizona's posturing appears to be part of a well-orchestrated attempt to shore
up the legal arguments being made in Crane v. Napolitano and to further undermine the use of prosecutorial discretion as an enforcement tool, but its position on the driver's license issue only underscores the flawed analysis in these
cases.
The basic argument in each of these cases is that the Administration
lacked the authority to grant deferred action to this group-based category. The
reality is that, as many scholars have underscored in their research and as the
Law Professors' Letter emphasizes, deferred action in particular has been used
as a tool for granting relief from removal since at least the early 1970s, and has

Id.; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (applying heightened rational basis to strike down § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which effectively denied federal
marriage benefits to same-sex couples legally married under State law, as a violation of equal
protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment).
280

281
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Pink Stripe on Illegal Immigrant North Carolina Licenses Eyed,
CHARLOTrE NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.wcnc.com/news/politics/Pink-stripe-on-

NC-illegal-immigrant-licenses-eyed-192349941.html.
282
Id.
283
Associated Press, North Carolina:Pink License Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at
A 19; Gustavo Valdes, North CarolinaDebuts Driver's Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants,
CNN NEWS (March 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/25/us/north-carolina-immigrantlicenses.
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been recognized by the federal government at least since the mid-1970s.284 In
deed, Congress specifically recognized deferred action in the REAL ID Act as
proof of lawful presence in setting forth rules for state issuance of driver's licenses.285 Moreover, it has been used in the past to grant relief from removal to
certain groups of individuals, including survivors of domestic violence with
approved VAWA self-petitions who are not immediately eligible to adjust and
certain widows of U.S. citizens who are not eligible for immigration status. 2 86
Furthermore, while the INA creates several statutory exceptions to persons who otherwise would be considered "unlawfully present," including minors, asylum seekers, beneficiaries of family unity, battered women and chil287
o
dren, and victims of trafficking, as a matter ofprosecutorialdiscretion, the
Adjudicator's Field Manual has extended the list of exceptions to the accrual of
unlawful presence to include a number of other categories, including persons
with pending applications for adjustment of status, extensions or change of status, or temporary protected status; or persons granted voluntary departure, stays
of removal, deferred action or delayed enforced departure.2 88 The Adjudicator's
Field Manual explicitly distinguishes being in unlawful status from accruing
unlawful presence. 2 89 Thus a person can only accrue unlawful presence if he or
she is in unlawful status, but, as a matter of prosecutorialdiscretion, a person
can be in unlawful status without accruing unlawful presence. 29 0 On the other
hand, persons with orders of supervision, which generally consist of persons
Law Professors' Letter, supra note 45, at 2 n.5.
See The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, Div. B. § 202(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 302
(2005).
286
Press Release, Dep't Homeland Sec., DHS Establishes Interim Relief for Widows of U.S.
Citizens (June 9, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-interim-reliefwidows-us-citizens.
287
See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii) (2012). "Unlawful presence" is a
term of art in the INA used specifically to refer to situations where an immigrant will be subject
to a 3-year bar from the United States for having been unlawfully present in the United States for
more than 180 days or a 10-year bar for unlawful presence for a year or more. See INA §
212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012). The statutory bars are triggered by departure from
the United States, and are subject to the foregoing statutory exceptions and the policy exceptions
discussed below.
288
USCIS ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL ch. 40.9.2 (b)(2)-(3) (2009), reproducedat 86 IR at
at
available
[hereinafter
AFM],
18,
2009)
(May
1420-70
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFMIO-0-0-1/0-0-0- 17138/0-0-0-18383.html.
The Adjudicator's Field Manual will be overhauled in the near future and included in a single,
online, centralized U.S. Policy Manual. USCIS Begins Transition to CentralizedPolicy Manual,
USCIS (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac
89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=d58459009ccfb31OVgnVCM100000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextc
hannel=d58459009ccfb31OVgnVCMOOOOO82ca6aRCRD
289
AFM, supra note 288, at ch. 40.9.2 (a)(2).
290
Id.
284
285
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with final orders of removal who cannot be removed to their homeland, as well
as applicants for ten-year cancellation of removal are eligible for work authorization29 1 but continue to accrue unlawful presence.292
The point is that, in addition to the statutory exceptions to unlawful
presence in INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iii), the Department of Homeland Security, as
a matter of prosecutorialdiscretion,293 has a long list of policy exceptions294
where, even though a noncitizen may not enjoy lawful status, he or she is considered to be here pursuant to a period of stay authorized by the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and thus, does not accrue unlawful presence.29 5 In other
cases, certain persons with pending applications for relief may be eligible for
work authorization but continue to accrue unlawful presence. All of these individuals enjoy a quasi-legal status which permits them to remain in the United
States while their status is pending. In general, the exceptions to unlawful presence do not cure any previous period of unlawful presence, and lawful presence
is deemed to end once it is determined that they are no longer eligible to remain
in the United States, such as when an application for extension of stay or for
asylum has been denied.296
In short, granting deferred action to certain childhood arrivals is nothing new. Both legacy INS and the Department of Homeland Security have, over
the years, used their prosecutorial discretion to grant temporary relief from removal to broad categories of noncitizens who may (or may not) be eligible for
immigration relief in the future. Sometimes this includes eligibility for work
authorization; sometimes, as with applicants for asylum whose cases have been
pending for less than 180 days, it does not.297 Sometimes these individuals may
be eligible for legal status in the future; sometimes, as with most persons with
final removal orders and orders of supervision, they will not.298 Often DHS
must balance policy considerations, such as deterring frivolous asylum claims,
against humanitarian considerations, in deciding how to structure relief. But in
many of these cases, the Agency has acted pursuant to its prosecutorial discre-

291
292
293

See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(10), (c)(18) (2013).
AFM, supra note 288, at ch. 40.9.2(b)(1)(D), (b)(6).
Id. at ch. 40.9.2(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Id. at ch. 40.9.2(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Id. at ch. 30.9.2(b)(1) (emphasis added).
296
Id. at ch. 40.9.2(b)(4).
297
INA § 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012).
298
This does not necessarily preclude persons with Orders of Supervision from being eligible
for future relief, if, for example, a statutory fix provided for such relief. See, e.g., Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. 105-100, Title II, §§ 201-202, 111 Stat. 2130
(1997) (providing that certain nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba present in the United States who
have previously been ordered removed could, notwithstanding such order, apply for adjustment
of status).
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tion rather than pursuant to statute. President Obama's power to grant deferred
action to certain childhood arrivals and to set the terms of relief was there all
along.
IV. DACA AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION

DACA was a justified assertion of Executive authority in the face of a
constitutional crisis marked by gridlock in Congress and growing restrictionism
in many states. By 2012's year end, with Congress and the Executive approaching the fiscal cliff, scholars and political pundits raised concerns about whether
our current political system was beyond repair. 2 99 Indeed, in an Op-Ed in The
New York Times on December 30, 2012, titled provocatively Let's Give Up on
the Constitution,Professor Seidman argues that "[o]ur obsession with the Constitution has saddled us with a dysfunctional political system, kept us from debating the merits of divisive issues and inflamed our public discourse." 300 He
argues that in several groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions, including
Brown v. Board of Education,301 Miranda v. Arizona,302 Roe v. Wade,30 and
Romer v. Evans,304 the Court has been accused of ignoring the Constitution. To
announce DACA on the eves of the Court's decision in Arizona v. United
States and the 2012 elections might be what Professor Seidman would describe
as an act of constitutional disobedience. Seidman concludes, however, that, in
many of these cases, ignoring the Constitution helped us to grow and prosper.3 0 s
The Obama Administration did not, however, ignore the Constitution.
It ignored the narrow, originalist interpretation urged by DACA's critics, who
largely have relied on formalistic, syllogistic arguments and the structure and
function of the original Constitution of 1787, while studiously ignoring, with
the exception, perhaps, of the anti-commandeering principles found in the
Tenth Amendment, the rights protected in the Bill of Rights and the post-Civil
War Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, they have ignored how the Reconstruction Amendments changed our original charter both structurally and ideologically, redefining the very concept of "personhood" and the rights of the in-
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Jennifer Steinhauer,A Showdown Long Foreseen, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2012, at Al.
Seidman, supra note 24, at A19.
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dividual vis-A-vis the state.306 The district court's ruling against Arizona's denial of driver's licenses to DACA recipients on equal protection grounds is thus
particularly encouraging.30 7 For similar reasons, the Administration's actions,
while stretching Executive powers to their limits, were necessary and appropriate in light of restrictionists' "linked and interdependent" 308 efforts to simultaneously challenge federal enforcement policies like DACA and the Morton
Memo, block reform in Congress, and implement state and local regulations infringing on immigrants' most basic rights, all through a combination of litigation, legislative, and media strategies.
Indeed, Kris Kobach and his allies in Congress, in the media, in the
ranks of ICE, and even on the courts have made effective use of rhetoric and
heuristics to taint people's understanding of the legal issues. 3 09 Their arguments
may resonate with the average citizen who thinks he or she has a basic understanding of American government, but on closer examination their arguments
are deeply flawed. Take for example the exchange below, which occurred when
Fox News first covered the ICE lawsuit on The O'Reilly Factor. Kobach and
Chris Crane engaged in this dialogue with Monica Crowley, who was standing
in for Bill O'Reilly:
CROWLEY: Kris Kobach, the unilateral action coming from
this administration in this regard, it seems to intervene [sic] directly federal immigration law as it currently stands and is
therefore illegal. Is that what you are arguing in this lawsuit?
KRIS KOBACH (R), KANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE:
Yes, that's right, Monica. It's illegal on multiple levels. But the
three main reasons its illegal is first of all, there is a federal
statute that already says that ICE agents like Chris Crane have
to put certain aliens into removal proceedings. Not may, but
306

See generally Juan Perea, Review, Race and ConstitutionalLaw Casebooks: Recognizing
the Pro-Slavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (2012). As Juan Perea points out, it was
not just Justice Taney who believed slaves were property, but some of our most revered framers.
Indeed, in Federalist No. 54, in explaining the 3/5ths clause, James Madison discussed how the
proposed Constitution properly treated slaves in part as property and in part, as persons. Id. at
1123. While the 13th Amendment abolished slavery, the 14th Amendment overturned the original Constitution's denial of personhood to the original slaves and their descendants. This concept
of personhood under the 14th Amendment has gradually been extended to embrace other marginalized groups, including women, immigrants, gays, and the disabled.
307
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. CV12-02456, 2013 WL 2128315, at *20 (D. Ariz.
May 16, 2013).
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See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 6, at 1435.
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shall place them in removal proceedings. It's ordering agents
to violate thatfederal law.
It's also illegal because it violates the Administrative Procedure Act. If they had statutory authority to do this in the
Obama administration, they would have had to promulgate a
regulation and have a commentary. They didn't do any of that.
And then thirdly, it violates the separationofpowers.
As you know, there have been two dozen DREAM Act bills in
Congress. And none of them have passed. Congress clearly
understands that only the legislative branch of the federal government can do this. Not the executive branch.
But it appears that Obama is trying to do this through executive
fiat and our Constitution does not allow that.
CROWLEY: And, Kris Kobach, on that point, I mean, the
Presidentof the United States as head of the Executive Branch
is supposed to be the nation'schief law enforcement officer. So
shouldn't he be upholding the law rather than, number one,
going around the legislative branch to make up his own laws
and, secondly, uphold existing law? I mean, he seems to be acting so extra-constitutionallyhere.310
Barely a month after DACA was announced, anti-immigrant forces
launched a destructive attack in the courts, in the media, in the states, and eventually in Congress, playing on the public's worst fears, using the Constitution
and heuristics as their side-arms. They misconstrued INA § 235 to concoct a
duty on the part of ICE officers to arrest all noncitizens present without admission, ignored the Executive's power to set enforcement priorities in carrying
out the law, applied an outdated version of the non-delegation doctrine, and
overlooked critical exceptions to notice and comment rulemaking, all to persuade the public that the Obama Administration was acting extraconstitutionally. The Administration undoubtedly knew that this backlash
would come. It thus took a bold political move with uncertain consequences.
Ideally, a better and more permanent solution would have been to work
with Congress to enact the DREAM Act. The danger with prosecutorial discretion is that it can always be reversed. Immigration reform had become impossible, however, even when it enjoyed majority support in both houses. Indeed,
from a formalist perspective, the Senate cloture rule requiring a super-majority

310 FOX News: O'Reilly Factor,supra note 18.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/8

54

Gilbert: Obama's Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of I

2013]

OBAMA'S RUBY SLIPPERS

309

in the Senate to cut off debate on a bill and allow it to come to a vote311 arguably violates the "single, finely wrought, and exhaustively considered, procedure" that the Framers created.312 Nonetheless, it has been justified on the basis
of the Senate's authority to make its own rules, and challenges in court have
been dismissed as nonjusticiable.313 Along the same lines, although the Framers
might never have contemplated the broad delegation of rule-making powers to
the Executive in matters of immigration, this has been U.S. policy for well over
100 years. To challenge it now in the context of DACA and efforts at comprehensive immigration reform seems more designed to perpetuate the dual crises
of federalism and separation of powers than to resolve them.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is a bit ironic that scholars who had criticized the breadth of the plenary power doctrine and judicial deference to Executive authority on immigration matters at least acquiesced in its use here. Perhaps that should give us
pause. At a minimum, we must urge the Administration to focus on legislative
solutions, and to avoid establishing a precedent for unilateralism that will be
subject to abuse in future administrations. Like Dorothy's ruby slippers, great
power can be used not only for good, but to oppress. It is not inconceivable that
the U.S. Supreme Court could set limits on enforcement discretion or at least
on its preemptive effect, as suggested by federal litigation on DACA in Arizona
and Texas in 2013. A legislative solution thus seems critical as a way to limit
obstructionism at the state and local level and by ICE officers in the field.
In Arizona v. United States, by acknowledging the ties that bind immigrants to our communities rather than focusing strictly on their formal legal status, a Supreme Court majority validated a model of immigration, what Profes311

S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., 113TH CONG., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXII
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312
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 921 (1983). In February 2013, President Obama made his
frustration with the cloture vote explicit, when Republicans prevented a vote on his nominee for
Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, a Republican and war hero, from coming to a vote. According to a piece in The New Yorker, the President said,
We've never had a Secretary of Defense filibustered before. There's nothing
in the Constitution that says that somebody should get sixty votes .... The
Republican minority in the Senate seems to think that the rule now is that you
have to have sixty votes for everything. Well, that's not the rule.
Hendrik Hertzberg, State of the (G.O.P.) Union, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2013, at 25; see also
Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
467, 468 (2011).
313 . Bondurant, supra note 312, at 507-08; see, e.g., Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d
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sor Hiroshi Motomura calls "immigration as affiliation," 314 that would offer a
pathway to legal status to undocumented persons within our borders who have
put down roots, raised families, and shown themselves to be reliable and productive members of society.3 15 It is a model of immigration consistent with repeated efforts at comprehensive immigration reform which embrace "earned
adjustment" or "earned citizenship" as heuristic alternatives to the vilified "amnesty,"3 16 offering a route to lawful permanent residency and ultimately, citizenship, to many of the 11 million undocumented immigrants living within our
borders and abiding by our laws. 1 Indeed, as talks in Congress on immigration
reform began almost immediately after the 2012 elections, the Administration
made it clear that it would not accept a legislative fix that did not include a
pathway to lawful permanent residency. 318 When on January 28, 2013, a group
of eight U.S. senators announced a Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform which included a "path to citizenship" it was a moment of
both hope and striking familiarity.31 9
If DACA serves as a stepping stone to passage of the DREAM Act and
comprehensive immigration reform, then this bold assertion of Executive authority will have lasting impact. Indeed, the impasse between Congress and the
Executive was one of the stated reasons for state and local governments taking
the regulation of immigrants into their own hands. The 2012 elections and the
Republican Party's apparent coming to terms with the consequences of its failure to court the Latino vote appear to have ended the stalemate, at least for the
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time being. 320 At the time of this writing, the U.S. Senate had recently passed
comprehensive immigration reform, 32 1 but its passage in the House of Representatives was far from certain.322
DACA was conceived both from acts of civil disobedience by the
DREAMerS323 and an expansive interpretation of Executive powers by the Administration that, rather than resulting in the DREAMers' detention and deportation, recognized their rightful place in our society. The release of the film
version of Les Miserables 24 in 2012 dramatically depicts how, in any social
movement, it always is possible that things can, and often do, go terribly
wrong. When the DREAMers began to come out of the shadows and to engage
in acts of civil disobedience, my first impulse was that, for some, this would
end badly. I knew from history and experience that the sacrifices made by people on the front lines who are willing to risk their lives to challenge the existing
status quo are what eventually make a difference. As a lawyer, I was hesitant to
advise a client to take such a step.
Nonetheless, once the DREAMers decided that civil disobedience was
their only available option, the opinion letter signed by 96 law professors was
consistent with those objectives. It emerged as the quintessential blend of
scholarship, activism, and professional responsibility. 32 It underscored that as
lawyers and legal scholars perhaps we have become too wedded by our opponents to narrow interpretations of the law and the rules of engagement. Similarly, in announcing DACA, the Obama Administration did not ignore the Constitution, but rather the constricted, originalist, hidebound version imposed by
immigration formalists. This country's ongoing crises in separation of powers
and federalism implicate immigrants' rights both at the state and national level,
and call for courageous solutions by Government, advocacy groups, and the
academic community that recognize the ways in which our country has been
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shaped by "the stories, talents and lasting contributions of those who crossed
oceans and deserts to come here." 3 26
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